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Abstract 
 
The percentage of S&P 500 firms using multi-year accounting-based performance (MAP) 
incentives to CEOs increased from 16.5% in 1996 to 43.3% in 2008. The use and design of MAP 
incentives depend on the signal quality of accounting vs. stock performance, shareholder horizons, 
strategic imperatives, and board independence. After the technology bubble, option expensing, and the 
publicity of option backdating, firms increasingly use stock-based MAP plans to replace options, resulting 
in changes in pay structure but not pay level. While firms respond to the evolving contracting 
environment, they consider firm characteristics and shareholder preferences and do not blindly follow the 
trend. 
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1. Introduction 
U.S. public firms increasingly tie CEO compensation to long-term accounting performance. The 
percentage of S&P 500 firms that adopt multi-year accounting-based performance (MAP) incentives has 
more than doubled from 16.5% in 1996 to 43.3% in 2008.  The average annualized target payout from the 
plans is around $2.2 million, roughly two times a CEO’s base salary, and exceeds the $1.67 million 
average target pay of traditional bonus plans.  In recent years, expected payouts from MAP incentives 
have exceeded those of option grants and become the most significant component of CEO compensation 
for firms with MAP incentives. Despite their growing popularity and being one of the key building blocks 
of executive incentive design, long-term accounting-based incentives receive little attention in academic 
literature and are the least understood type of performance incentives.1 This lapse in research can lead to a 
biased understanding of the true ex ante incentives that executives face. 
Moreover, the recent shift towards MAP incentives suggests that the landscape of long-term 
incentives for CEOs has changed from a purely stock price driven approach (i.e. restricted stocks and 
option grants) to a combination of accounting and stock performance-based incentives. It is unclear 
whether the shift is an outcome of incentive alignment, CEO rent-seeking, or changes in accounting rules 
and market sentiment during the period.  To shed light on these issues, we offer the first large sample 
study that documents the use and design of MAP plans, investigates the cross-sectional variation in the 
determinants of plan adoption and structure, and analyzes the growing trend of MAP incentives.  
From over 8,600 annual proxy filings of all S&P 500 firms from 1996 to 2008, we identify 1,936 
MAP contracts granted to CEOs during the period and hand-collect the details of these contracts.2  These 
contracts evaluate managers based on sets of pre-determined accounting-based targets over multi-year 
 
1 Figure 1 illustrates the four quadrants of incentive contracts of U.S. public firms along the two dimensions of 
incentive design: the choice of performance measures (accounting vs. stock performance) and the length of the 
performance evaluation period (one year vs. multi-year). Researchers have extensively studied three of the four 
types of incentives: incentives based on stock returns of various horizons (i.e. stock and option grants, performance 
plans contingent on stock returns) and incentives contingent on short-term accounting performances (i.e., bonuses). 
In contrast, there are only a limited number of studies on long-term accounting performance incentive using small 
samples of contracts granted during the ‘70s and ‘80s (Larcker, 1983; Tehranian, Travlos and Waegelein, 1987; 
Kumar and Sopariwala, 1992; Gaver, Gaver and Battistel, 1992), and we are not aware of any study on these 
incentives in the past two decades.  
2 Appendix A provides an example of a MAP plan initiated by Boeing Co in 2006. 
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performance periods (generally three years). Failure to achieve the minimum performance criteria results 
in no payment. The performance criteria can be based on earnings, sales, cash flows, or efficiency 
measures like economic value added (EVA). About 20% of the MAP plans disclose that their firms use 
relative performance evaluation (RPE) to evaluate firm accounting performance against peer groups. The 
expected payout from MAP plans can be cash-based (about 42%), equity-based (55%), or both (3%), with 
companies increasingly granting equity-based MAP plans after 2002. 
We first examine firms’ decisions to adopt MAP plans based on the predictions of contracting 
theories along the two dimensions that uniquely characterize MAP contracts: the choice of accounting 
performance and the multi-year evaluation period. Agency theory suggests that firms prefer performance 
measures with high signaling quality in reflecting executive efforts (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Holmstrom, 1979; Murphy, 1985).  Thus, the grant decision depends on the relative signal-to-noise ratio 
of accounting versus stock performance (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987; Lambert and Larcker, 
1987). Consistent with this expectation, we find that a firm is more likely to adopt a MAP contract if the 
ratio of stock volatility to accounting volatility is high.  Certain firm characteristics can also affect the 
relative informativeness of stock and accounting signals.  In high-growth firms, stock price may better 
incorporate the potential consequences of managerial actions than accounting measures (Lambert and 
Larcker, 1987). In contrast, stock prices may be less informative in complex firms because they are 
difficult to evaluate for outsiders.  Supporting these views, we find that firms with high sales growth rates 
are less likely to grant a MAP contract, while multi-segment firms are more likely to do so.   
A firm’s choice of incentive contracts also depends on its shareholders’ horizon. Several studies show 
that shareholders use compensation incentives to align managerial horizons with their own (e.g., Bolton, 
Scheinkman, and Xiong, 2006; Cadman and Sunder, 2014).  Because MAP incentives utilize long-term 
evaluation periods and firms often emphasize “managerial long-term focus” at the time of the grants,3 we 
expect MAP incentives to be less desirable to short-term shareholders. We find confirming evidence that 
 
3 For examples of firms that emphasize long-term focus when granting MAP incentives, see Boeing Co.’s 2006 
proxy statement; ConocoPhillips Co.’s 2005 proxy statement; and Brown-Forman Corporation’s 2007 proxy 
statement.  
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firms consider shareholders’ horizon preferences when design compensation incentives. Firms with more 
short-term shareholders, as measured by various shareholder turnover measures, are less likely to use 
MAP incentives.   
We next study the design of MAP incentives, such as the choice of accounting criteria, the length of 
the performance period, the decision to use relative performance evaluation, and the award type (cash vs. 
stock). Consistent with predictions from contracting theories, we find that firms are more likely to choose 
a performance measure when it is less volatile and is related to the firm’s strategic priorities. Firms use 
more relative performance evaluation when firm performance co-moves more with industry performance. 
Firms with volatile past performance and more long-term shareholders prefer longer evaluation periods.  
Financially constrained firms and firms that require a certain level of CEO ownership are more likely to 
choose stock-based MAP plans over cash-based ones. In general, the findings are consistent with the view 
that firms design MAP incentives to better align the CEO’s interests with the firm’s strategic priorities 
and concerns.    
The percentage of S&P 500 firms using MAP incentives grew significantly since 2002. To examine if 
the time series trend has changed the determinants of granting a MAP plan, we divide the sample into pre- 
and post-2002 sub-groups. We find that in both periods, the decision to grant MAP incentives depends on 
accounting signal quality, shareholder horizon, and board independence. Early adopters (firms that started 
granting MAP plans before 2002) have the highest stock to accounting volatility ratios, the longest 
shareholder horizons, and the most independent boards. Late adopters (firms that started granting MAP 
plans after 2002) trail behind in all three aspects, while firms that never adopt MAP plans come in last. 
These results suggest that companies that benefit the most from using long-term accounting signals adopt 
MAP plans first.  Firms with short-term shareholders and weak accounting signals choose not to adopt 
long-term accounting-based incentives regardless of the shifting trend after 2002. 
There remains the question that what has swayed those “late adopters” towards MAP incentives after 
2002. The growing popularity of MAP incentives since the early 2000s coincides with the burst of the 
stock bubble, the expensing of equity-based compensation, and several high profile accounting and option 
4 
 
backdating scandals. We examine whether these non-mutually exclusive factors contribute to the time 
series trend of MAP plan adoptions. First, the technology bubble may have made directors and 
shareholders more wary of the signal quality of stock performance, as they witnessed that stock prices can 
deviate from fundamental values for a prolonged period of time. Consistent with this view, we find that 
firms that experienced elevated valuations during the bubble period (i.e. 1997 to 1999) are more likely to 
initiate MAP grants after 2002.  
Second, the trend to expense options creates a more level playing field between stock options and 
other compensation incentives and may have pushed some firms that were previously on the fence 
towards MAP plans. Many firms started to voluntarily expense option grants around 2002, and the SEC 
adopted FASB ASC Topic 718 that mandates option expensing after June 2005 (Aboody, Barth, and 
Kasznik, 2004). Firms, especially the ones that are barely profitable, may have granted stock options 
because they can defer related compensation costs to temporarily boost reported earnings. After the 
accounting treatment change that removes the expensing advantage, we expect these firms to start 
switching to other types of compensation incentives. Supporting this argument, we find that firms with 
close to zero net profit margins prior to the accounting treatment change (2000 to 2002) are more likely to 
adopt MAP plans in subsequent years. Third, the breakout of option backdating scandals in 2005 and 
2006 may have created negative public sentiment towards stock options and drive some firms to switch 
from option grants to MAP incentives.  Consistent with this view, we find that firms in industries with 
more incidences of option backdating are more likely to initiate MAP plans after these incidences are 
publicized.  
When switching from options to MAP incentives, our analysis shows that firms prefer to use stock-
based MAP plans over cash-based ones. Specifically, the percentage of stock-based MAP plans increased 
from 43.4% in 2002 to 69.4% in 2008. In contrast, the percentage of cash-based MAP plans decreases 
from 53.1% to 28.8% despite their generally more favorable accounting expensing treatment than equity-
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based pay.4 Firms granting stock-based MAP plans experience significantly greater decreases in option 
grants than matched peers in the post-2002 period, while the differences in the changes of options grants 
are insignificant between firms granting cash-based MAP plans and their matched peers. Replacing stock 
options with stock-based MAP plans shows that firms do not shy away from equity-based pay in the post-
bubble period. Instead, firms try to combine accounting and stock performance together to provide more 
balanced long-term incentives.  
In contrast to the incentive alignment view of MAP incentives, an alternative explanation is that 
powerful CEOs use these incentives to extract rents at the expense of shareholders. Not supporting the 
CEO power view, we find that firms with independent boards are more likely to use MAP plans and 
proxies for CEO power are not positively related to the grant decision. Further, in both pre-2002 and post-
2002 periods, CEOs with either cash- or stock-based MAP contracts do not receive higher total or excess 
pay compared with their matched peers without such contracts. 
Our paper adds to the executive compensation literature by providing details on the under-studied 
long-term accounting-based incentive contracts. Studying the adoption and structure of these contracts 
helps us to evaluate whether firms design incentives in accordance with the general contracting theory. In 
addition, together with earlier studies on bonuses, options and other stock grants, our study helps 
researchers and practitioners piece together the universe of ex-ante incentives faced by CEOs. 
We also contribute to the literature by documenting and exploring the time series trend of MAP 
incentives, which reflects an important regime shift in compensation design in the past decade.  Our study 
indicates that firms are moving towards incorporating diverse long-term performance hurdles to evaluate 
executives. The shift towards MAP plans also provides a good opportunity to study if changes in 
compensation design are related to changes in public policy and sentiment, which is an important area 
that more academic studies are called for (Murphy, 2012).  Our evidence shows that while firms respond 
 
4 Cash-based performance plans with pure accounting-based performance criteria are unaffected by the FASB rule 
change and enjoy the most favorable accounting treatment both before and after 2005. They can be expensed when 
the performance criteria are satisfied and the plan payouts are earned.   
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to changes in the macro environment, they still consider firm characteristics and shareholder preferences 
and do not blindly follow the trend.  
Our study also shows that this current change in CEO compensation design significantly differs from 
a previous noteworthy trend shift. In the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, firms started paying CEOs generous 
option grants in response to the shareholder activism that demanded higher pay–performance sensitivity. 
The increase in option grants did not substitute for other forms of compensation and significantly 
increased the overall pay level of executives (Murphy, 2012). In contrast, the current shift towards MAP 
plans is accompanied by a simultaneous reduction in stock options, resulting in changes in CEO pay 
structure, but not in pay level.  
2. Literature review 
Larcker (1983) pioneered studies in long-term accounting performance contracts and studied 25 firms 
that granted long-term accounting-based performance plans to CEOs between 1972 and 1979.  Several 
follow-up studies examine long-term performance plans granted in the ‘70s and ‘80s.5  The lack of recent 
research on MAP plans is probably due to data limitation and a lack of attention to incentives that are not 
based on stock returns.  To our knowledge, our study is the first to reveal the recent trend of firms’ 
increasingly using long-term accounting-based incentives, and is the first large sample study that provides 
a descriptive analysis on the design of MAP incentives and explores firms’ motivations to adopt such 
incentives.  
It is important to understand the details of performance plans to fully account for the true ex ante 
incentives firms provide to CEOs (e.g., Kole, 1997, Johnson and Tian, 2000).  With hand collected data, 
several recent studies are moving towards this direction.  Kim and Yang (2012) study the performance 
metrics used in annual bonus plans from 2006 to 2009.  De Angelis and Grinstein (2014) investigate 
 
5 Tehranian, Travlos and Waegelein (1987) study 66 divesting firms that have some form of long-term performance 
plans from 1974 to 1982 and find that these firms received more favorable market reactions on the divestiture 
announcement days.  Kumar and Sopariwala (1992) investigate 62 firms that adopted long-term performance plans 
contingent upon the “achievement of long-term accounting numbers” from 1978 to 1982.  These firms experienced 
positive announcement day returns and subsequent improvements in accounting performance.  Contrary to previous 
findings, Gaver, Gaver and Battistel (1992) use a sample of 209 performance plan adoptions in the 1970s and report 
no significant market reaction.  
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performance-contingent contracts issued in 2007.   Gerakos, Ittner, and Larcker (2007) study a subsample 
of firms that grant performance-vested stock options between 1993 and 2002.  Bettis et al. (2010) 
investigate 983 equity grants with performance provisions from 1995 to 2001. Bettis et al. (2014) study 
option and stock grants with any performance provision for a sample of large firms from 1998 to 2012. 
Our study differs from those of Gerakos et al. (2007) and Bettis et al. (2010, 2014) in both the 
research question and the type of contracts studied.  As demonstrated in Figure 1, we focus on firms’ 
choices of ex ante performance incentives and choose to study a clearly defined category of compensation 
incentives: all contracts that are contingent on meeting long-term accounting performance requirements.  
In contrast, the other papers focus on equity grants with any type of performance provisions attached, i.e., 
the performance period can be either short- or long-term, and the performance matrices can be stock 
price- or accounting-based. For example, 46.3% of the equity grants in Bettis et al. (2010) are contingent 
on only stock performance hurdles. Moreover, these papers focus exclusively on equity-based grants and 
do not include cash-based performance grants. In our sample, 41.5% of MAP plans are cash-based grants 
and almost none of the MAP plans are option-based. 
The research questions that we focus on are the cross-sectional determinants and time-series trend of 
the use and design of long-term accounting-based performance incentives. In comparison, Gerakos et al. 
(2007) and Bettis et al. (2010) both focus on why firms add various performance provisions to traditional 
option or stock awards. Bettis et al. (2014) investigates how the added performance provisions change the 
equity grants’ expected values and sensitivity to stock price (delta) and volatility (vega). Our study, 
combined with these other studies in the area, helps piece together the changing compensation landscape 
in U.S. towards performance-contingent plans and evaluates the validity of such change.   
3. Data collection and MAP contracts 
3.1. Sample and data sources 
We begin with all firms that appear at least once in the S&P 500 index from 1996 to 2008.  We start 
our sample period in 1996 because that since May 1996, the SEC has required all public U.S. firms to 
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submit filings via the EDGAR system.6 We collect information on compensation plans from each firm’s 
annual proxy statements (DEF 14A).  The initial sample consists of 8,683 firm–year (859 firms) 
observations with identifiable proxy statements. 
We obtain accounting and segment data from the Compustat database and compensation data from 
the ExecuComp database.  Stock-related data are from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database.  We require each sample firm to have information on market capitalization and total 
compensation, which restricts our sample for firm characteristic analysis to 8,418 firm–years (859 firms).  
Information on institutional holdings and turnovers is from the CDA Spectrum database of the SEC 13-f 
filings.  We obtain board of director characteristics and CEO tenure data from the RiskMetrics database 
and use annual proxy statements to fill in missing information. 
3.2. Identifying MAP contracts 
Since 1992, the SEC has required firms to disclose all elements of compensation in formatted tables 
in proxy statements.7  Prior to 2006, most firms report the magnitudes and horizons of their granted MAP 
plans in “Long-term Incentive Plans” tables (the name may vary across filings). The new SEC 
amendment in December 2006 requires firms to report the expected payouts and performance horizons of 
MAP plans as a part of the “Grants of Plan-Based Awards” tables in proxy statements.  Other contractual 
details are often disclosed in the “Compensation Discussion and Analysis” section or in the footnotes of 
the “Summary Compensation Table” and the “Grants of Plan-Based Awards” tables. 
We use the following four criteria to identify a MAP plan.  First, the performance evaluation period 
has to be longer than 12 months.  We exclude plans that are called long term by the firm but the CEO can 
receive payments if a specific annual target is met within the performance period.8  Second, the terms of 
the contract must be specified before the performance period.  We exclude plans that allow firms to set 
 
6 See details at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm. 
7 Executive Compensation Disclosure, Release No. 33-6962 (October 16, 1992). 
8 For example, in 2006, Campbell Soup Co. granted a three-year long-term incentive plan.  During the 2006–2008 
performance period, the executive could receive one-third of the target payment each year if a specific earnings per 
share goal for that fiscal year was achieved. We consider such plans similar to annual bonus plans. 
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the performance criteria annually or to revise them during the performance period.9  Third, at least one of 
the performance hurdles used has to be accounting based.  Plans that rely only on stock performance 
hurdles are not included.  Lastly, we consider only contingent-vesting plans that grant no payout if the 
CEO misses the minimum performance criteria.  From 1996 to 2008, 383 firms granted 1,936 MAP plans 
to their CEOs that cover 2,463 (28.37%) firm years in our sample. 10  Within the sample, 19 firms 
employed MAP plans in all 13 years, 37 firms used MAP plans in 10 years or more, 120 firms granted 
MAP plans for 5 to 9 years, and 207 firms used MAP plans for less than five years. 
The expected payment from a MAP plan is convex with a lower boundary at zero. A cash-based MAP 
plan has a fixed maximum payout, while the maximum payment from a stock-based MAP plan has 
unbounded upward potential as the underlying stock price increases. For illustration, Figure 2 presents the 
payoff structure of a stock-based MAP plan granted by the Coca-Cola Company in 2006.  
3.3. The contractual features of MAP contracts 
After identifying a MAP contract, we collect the following contract features: 1) the start and end dates 
of the performance period, 2) the performance measures and benchmarks, 3) the expected threshold, 
target, and maximum payouts, 4) the award type, which can be cash, stocks, options, or mixed.11 Firms 
can grant MAP plans on an overlapping or non-overlapping basis.  A firm can grant a new MAP award 
every year (overlapping grants). For example, Coca-Cola Co. granted its CEO a three-year MAP grant in 
1996 that covers the performance period from 1996 to 1998, and then granted a 1997 grant that covers 
1997 to 1999.  Alternatively, a firm may grant a new MAP plan only when the previous one expires (non-
overlapping grants).  Altria Group Inc. granted its CEO a MAP plan in 1998 that covers the performance 
 
9 For example, AT&T granted a three-year long-term incentive plan in 1996 that allows the performance level to be 
set on a yearly basis. 
10 The total number of MAP plans in our sample is 2,061 with 125 firm-year observations have two or more MAP 
grants in a year.  For years with multiple grants, we aggregate the payout amounts as the payout amount for that year.  
If the performance periods are not the same, we take the later year as the last performance year.  All results hold if 
we exclude these 138 firm–year observations from our analysis. 
11 The award type specifies the form of the expected contingent payout, which can be a cash-based award with fixed 
value or stock and option grants with fixed shares. After the payout amount is determined at the end of the 
performance period, irrespective of the award type, the actual remuneration to executives can be paid out in cash, 
equivalent stocks, or a mixed payment. The MAP plan from Boeing Co, as shown in Appendix A, is an example 
where the award type is cash based, but the actual payment can be made in cash or stock at the board’s discretion. 
Firms often make payment decisions based on CEOs’ existing stock ownership levels. 
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period from 1998 to 2000, and then granted the next plan in 2001 to cover 2001 to 2003.  Out of the 1,936 
grants in our sample, 204 (10.54%) grants are non-overlapping and 1,732 (89.46%) are overlapping.  
Firms may favor overlapping grants because CEOs prefer to receive regular payments on an annual basis.  
Overlapping plans also give firms more flexibility to adjust performance criteria as economic 
environment and business strategies change.  
Figure 3 presents the time series trend of MAP grants. In 1997, about 21.22% of the firms were 
covered by a MAP award.12 The percentage is more than doubled to 43.31% in 2008.  As Panel B 
illustrates, 43.4% of MAP grants are stock-based grants in 2002, and the number increases to 69.4% in 
2008. In contrast, the percentage of cash-based MAP grants decreases from 53.1% to 28.8% in that same 
period. This pattern suggests that the rise of MAP contracts is mostly driven by the increasing use of 
stock-based MAP contracts.  Panel A of Figure 4 shows the industry distribution of firm-year 
observations that are covered by MAP plans based on the one-digit Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) code.  For comparison, we also include the industry distribution of all firm years in our sample.  A 
χ2 test indicates that the two distributions are not different (p-value equals 0.243), suggesting that there is 
no clustering of MAP plans in a particular industry. Panel B shows that the industry distribution of MAP 
plans does not change much before and after 2002, suggesting that the increasing use of MAP plans after 
2002 is not a phenomena particular to certain industries.  
Table 1 presents detailed contractual features of the 1,936 MAP awards.  As shown in Panel A, the 
length of the performance period ranges from 1.5 years to 10 years, with the majority of the awards 
(82.85%) using a three-year period.  In terms of award type in Panel B, 41.48% of the awards were cash 
based and 55.27% were stock based, with 3.20% using a mixture of cash, stock, and options.  Only one 
MAP award in our sample defines the expected payment in options.13 
Panel C shows the type of performance benchmark used to evaluate firm performance. Of the 1,936 
MAP awards, 63.22% of the plans evaluate performance against an absolute value selected by the board. 
 
12 The coverage in 1996 may be biased downward because this year is the first year of our sample collection. The 
sample would miss MAP awards granted before 1996, but covers the year 1996.  
13 This MAP award was a one-time grant made by Hudson City Bancorp Inc. in 2006. 
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Three hundred and eleven (16.06%) grants use at least one relative measure, where the accounting 
performance is compared to that of selected peer companies or the constituents of a specific index. We 
could not find benchmark information for 20.71% of MAP grants. Firms often cite protecting proprietary 
information as the reason for not disclosing the benchmark information.  
Panel D of Table 1 presents information on performance criteria used in MAP contracts. Earnings-
based performance measures, such as earnings per share, return on assets (ROA), net income, and return 
on equity (ROE), are most widely used.  About 83.42% of the awards include at least one earnings-based 
performance hurdle and 56.15% use earnings-based targets exclusively.  Sales-based targets are the next 
most popular criterion (16.12%), followed by measures based on cash flows and economic value added 
(EVA) (8.83% and 8.21%, respectively).  Twenty eight (1.45%) MAP plans use an “unknown” 
accounting measure, where the firms did not disclose the specific accounting criteria used. We find that 
394 (20.35%) MAP grants combine some forms of stock price based criteria with accounting-based 
performance criteria.14 Our results are robust if we exclude these 394 awards from our analysis.  
Panel E of Table 1 presents the annualized threshold, target, and maximum expected payouts of MAP 
awards, along with other compensation components.15 The target amount is paid out when the target 
performance criteria are reached. For stock-based MAP grants, the target payout amount is calculated as 
target shares times grant day stock price. If the firm meets or exceeds the highest performance criteria, the 
MAP payout is “capped” at the maximum value, which is usually set as a multiple of the target value. The 
threshold payout is the minimum positive pay if firm achieves the minimum performance criteria. Failing 
to meet the minimum performance criteria would result in zero payment. 16    For non-overlapping MAP 
 
14 We separate MAP awards that specify the weights of the stock-based and accounting-based performance criteria 
and report only the accounting-based component as a MAP grant. For these 394 MAP grants, we either cannot 
determine the weight for different criteria or the stock criteria acts as a multiplier that magnifies the plan’s payout. 
15 The panel does not include 15 grants that have no information on total compensation in ExecuComp. For the 
remaining 1,921 grants, 57 grants do not disclose any payout information. There are 56 grants disclosed both the 
threshold and maximum payout, but not the target payout. For these grants, we estimate the target amount as the 
average of threshold and maximum pay. All missing threshold or maximum values remain untreated, resulting in 
different numbers of observations in Panel E. 
16 In our sample, 40% of MAP plans do not disclose threshold pay. Some plan payouts may decline gradually to zero 
as performance deteriorates, and thus do not specifically define a non-zero threshold pay (i.e. the 2001 MAP grant 
from Mcgraw-Hill Co). Some firms may simply choose not to disclose the threshold pay as it is not required by SEC. 
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grants, the payouts are only received every couple of years when the performance periods end.  We 
annualize the expected payments from these MAP grants by dividing the threshold, target, and maximum 
payouts by the number of years in the performance periods.  We convert all values to 2007 dollar levels 
using the Consumer Price Index compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
In our sample, the average (median) annualized target payout for a MAP award is $2.15 million 
($1.41 million).  The average (median) maximum annualized payout is $3.89 million ($2.65 million) and 
the minimum annualized payout is $0.73 million ($0.47 million).  On average, the annual target payout is 
about 22.30% of CEOs’ total compensation and is the second largest pay component after option grants in 
our sample period for MAP-plan granting firms.17  We plot the mean annualized MAP target payouts and 
the estimated values of annual option grants from 1996 to 2008 in Figure 5.A.  As shown, the target 
payouts of MAP grants are significantly lower than option grants in the first half of the sample period, but 
the two grants become comparable afterwards.  This trend is true for both firm–year observations with 
MAP grants and for all firm–year observations in our sample.  To control for the size of CEO total 
compensation, we further divide the annualized MAP target pay and the value of option grants by total 
compensation. With the average annual percentages, we find a similar pattern in Figure 5.B. After 2004, 
the target awards of MAP plans as a percentage of CEO total pay exceeds the percentage of option grants 
in CEO total pay.  Taken together, the results suggest that MAP plans have grown to be a very significant 
component of CEO compensation in recent years.  
4. Determinants of granting a MAP plan 
4.1. Hypothesis development  
Contracting theories suggest that firms should adopt MAP plans when long-term accounting 
 
17 The comparison should be interpreted with caution because the expected value of MAP plans depends on both the 
ex ante probability of meeting the performance criteria and the expected payout amounts. Most companies do not 
fully disclose plan details that are needed to estimate the probability of achieving the performance criteria. For 
example, firms may not disclose the sales growth target to protect proprietary information, or the formula and 
adjustments used to calculate the accounting criteria (i.e. EVA, ROIC, or adjusted operating income). Moreover, 
currently there is no widely accepted model estimating the value of accounting performance contingent plans as the 
Black-Scholes (1973) model does for option grants. The SEC requires firms to expense equity-based MAP grants at 
the grant date fair value based on the probable performance outcome. Companies often choose to use the target 
award value as the grant day fair value.  
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performance best reflects executive actions and shareholder preferences.  In this section, we develop 
hypothesis based on the predictions of contracting theories and discuss the construction of empirical 
proxies for each determinant we propose.  
4.1.1. MAP plans and the choice of performance measures 
When managerial efforts are not directly observable, agency theories suggest designing incentive 
contracts that rely on signals to evaluate executive performance (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Holmstrom, 1979; Murphy, 1985; Jensen, 1986; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987).  Therefore, the choice 
of performance measures depends on each measure’s signal quality. 
Previous research has shown that a firm’s choice of performance measures is affected by each 
measure’s signal-to-noise ratio with respect to managerial actions (Holmstrom, 1979; Lambert and 
Larcker, 1987).  If a firm’s stock performance is volatile relative to its accounting performance, the firm 
may assign more weight to its accounting performance and vice versa.  Following the literature, we use 
the firm’s ratio of stock volatility to accounting performance volatility to capture the relative amount of 
noise in different signals.  Stock volatility is measured as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns 
over the past five years, while the accounting volatility is the standard deviation of return on asset (ROA) 
over the same period. Using the signal-to-noise ratio measure, we hypothesize the following. 
H1A: A firm is more likely to grant MAP plans when its ratio of stock performance volatility to 
accounting performance volatility is high. 
Companies with complex business structures are more difficult for outsiders to appraise and their 
stock prices would be less informative than those of single segment firms.  Thus, we expect complex 
firms to prefer incorporating internal accounting performance measures to supplement external signals 
when evaluating executive actions.  Using the number of business segments to measure the complexity of 
the firm’s business operations, we hypothesize the following. 
H1B: Multi-segment firms are more likely to grant MAP plans. 
The other factor that affects the weights on different performance measures is how sensitive these 
signals are to managerial actions.  Lambert and Larcker (1987) argue that high-growth firms would prefer 
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using stock performance because stock prices can better incorporate the future consequences of 
managerial actions.  Accounting-based measures, however, are generally less sensitive due to the 
constraint of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and cost-based reporting requirements.  
Therefore, we expect high-growth firms to give more weight to stock-based measures than to accounting-
based measures, as CEO actions have greater future consequences in these firms.   
H1C: Firms with high sales growth rates are less likely to grant MAP plans. 
4.1.2. MAP plans and shareholder investment horizons 
Studies show that shareholders want to align the manager’s horizon with that of their own.  Bolton et 
al. (2006) present a model showing that if incumbent shareholders have short-term speculative goals, the 
optimal compensation contract should emphasize short-term stock returns.  Cadman and Sunder (2014) 
document that venture capitalists provide managers with relatively short-horizon incentive contracts that 
correspond to their anticipated exit times.  Froot, Perold, and Stein (1992) and Stein (1996) also suggest a 
link between the short-term investment horizon of shareholders and short-termism in managerial behavior. 
MAP plans utilize a multi-year evaluation period, and firms often emphasize managerial long-term 
focus as one of the main reasons to grant these plans in proxy statements.  Larcker (1983) argues that a 
long-term performance plan is an effective tool to extend managerial decision horizon and prevent 
myopic behavior.  Thus, firms with more short-term shareholders would be less likely to adopt a MAP 
plan.  We focus our analysis on the effect of short-term shareholders because the predictions for firms 
with more long-term shareholders are not clear.  Firms have several long-term incentive tools at their 
disposal, such as restricted stocks and/or option grants with a long vesting period.  The choice between 
MAP plans and other long-term incentive contracts depends on the contracting environment and firm 
characteristics. 
We first use the average monthly stock turnover ratio in a fiscal year to capture shareholder 
investment horizon. We expect the average shareholder horizon to be shorter if the stock turnover ratio is 
higher (e.g., Polk and Sapienza, 2009; Dong, Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2012).  An alternative horizon 
measure that we use is the value weighted average of each firm’s institutional investors’ portfolio churn 
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ratios, as formalized by Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005).  The churn ratio uses institutional investors’ 
entire portfolio holdings to capture their investment horizons, which minimizes the potential influence of 
any individual firm’s trading volume change. We also use a firm’s value weighted institutional investor 
turnover ratio as a third proxy for investor horizons.  Using these horizon proxies, we hypothesize the 
following. 
H2: Firms that have more short-term shareholders are less likely to adopt MAP plans. 
4.2. Firm characteristics and the decision to grant MAP incentives 
      Table 2 presents the univariate comparison of firm characteristics between firm-year observations 
covered by a MAP plan and those that are not.  All key variables of interest are significantly different 
between the two groups.  Firm-year observations with MAP awards have a significantly higher stock-to-
earnings volatility ratio, a lower sales growth rate, and more business segments.  The differences support 
our hypothesis that firms prefer accounting-based performance signals when these signals are more 
reliable.  The average monthly stock turnover is significantly lower in firm-year observations with MAP 
grants, suggesting that shareholder horizons of MAP-plan granting firms tend to be longer.  
To examine the determinants of a firm’s propensity to grant a MAP plan, we estimate the following 
model: 
Prob(=1 if firm grants a MAP plan in yeart) = f (Stock volatility/earnings volatilityt-1, sale 
growtht-1, # business segmentst-1, stock turnover proxiest-1, control variables)                      (1) 
The dependent variable is a binary variable that equals one if the CEO receives a MAP grant in year t and 
zero otherwise. We control for several CEO and firm characteristics that have been shown to affect 
compensation design in the literature.  These variables include binary variables that indicate if the CEO is 
approaching retirement (age ≥ 65) or if the CEO is new (tenure ≤ 2), CEO tenure, CEO ownership, 
percentage of insider directors, board size, fiscal year stock return, return on assets, research and 
development (R&D) expenditures over total assets, advertising expenditures over total assets, capital 
expenditures over total assets, institutional ownership, and the natural log of the firm’s market 
capitalization. We measure firm-level independent variables in the year prior to the respective MAP 
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grants.  CEO variables are measured in the year of the grants except for CEO ownership, which is 
measured in the year prior to the respective MAP grants. We also include industry and year dummies to 
control for unobservable industry and year effects. The statistical significance is calculated based on 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. Appendix B provides the definitions and calculations for 
all variables. All non-binary variables are winsorized at the 99% and 1% values. 
Table 3 presents the marginal effects from the probit model estimation of equation (1).  As 
hypothesized, the likelihood of adopting a MAP plan is significantly positively related to the stock-to-
earnings volatility ratio.  In untabulated test, we re-estimate the volatility ratio using systematic stock 
volatility to capture the noise in stock performance that is unrelated to managerial actions and find similar 
result (coeff=0.007, p-value=0.001).18 Firms with high sales growth rates are less likely to grant MAP 
plans, supporting the argument that growth firms may not prefer accounting measures because they are 
less sensitive to executive actions. In untabulated test, we use market-to-book ratio to replace sales 
growth rate and find a significant negative coefficient on this alternative proxy (coeff=-0.037, p-
value=0.003).  The significantly positive coefficient of the number of business segments is consistent 
with our hypothesis that complex firms are more likely to supplement stock performance with internal 
performance measures when evaluating CEOs. Collectively, these results suggest that firms prefer 
accounting performance measures when they provide better signals of executive efforts. In terms of 
economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in the stock-to-earnings volatility ratio or the 
number of business segments increases a firm’s probability of granting a MAP plan by 3.64% and 3.08%, 
respectively. Meanwhile, a one standard deviation increase in sales growth rate decreases the probability 
by 2.98%. 
To capture firms with more short-term (long-term) investors, we construct a high (low) stock turnover 
binary variable that equals one if the firm’s average monthly stock turnover ratio is in the top (bottom) 
quartile that year, and zero otherwise.  The coefficient on the top quartile dummy is -0.065 and significant 
 
18 To obtain the systematic stock volatility, we first conduct time-series regressions of monthly stock returns on 
monthly value-weighted market returns for a five year rolling window. We then calculate the standard deviation of 
the predicted values as the systematic stock volatility.   
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at the 1% level, indicating that on average the probability of granting MAP plans in these firms is 6.5% 
lower than in other firms.  The result confirms that firms with more short-term shareholders are less likely 
to use long-term incentives like MAP plans. The coefficient on the bottom turnover quartile dummy is 
positive but not significant, suggesting that the presence of long-term shareholders would not guarantee 
that firms will choose MAP plans over other long-term incentives. In untabulated tests, we use two 
alternative measures to construct the shareholder horizon dummies: the weighted average of the 
institutional investors’ churn ratios as in Gaspar et al. (2005), and the weighted average turnover ratios of 
a firm’s institutional investors. We obtain similar results with both measures. When using the weighted 
average churn ratios to construct the horizon dummies, the coefficient on the top quartile dummy is -
0.030 and statistically significant at the 5% level. When using institutional investors’ turnover ratios to 
construct the horizon dummies, the coefficient on the top quartile dummy is -0.048 and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Similar to the baseline results, the coefficient on the bottom quartile dummy is 
insignificant for both alternative measures.    
The results thus far are consistent with the view of incentive alignment, where board of directors 
choose performance signals that fit firm characteristics and shareholder horizons. A less benign view of 
incentive design is that powerful CEOs under weak governance can use incentive contracts to maximize 
their own benefits (i.e. Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Past literature suggests that CEOs could gain power 
and become entrenched through tenure (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Berger, Ofek, and Yermack, 
1997; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004; Harford and Li, 2007) and that independent boards are less likely to 
collude with the CEO (e.g., Weisbach, 1988; Brickley, Coles and Terry, 1994; Borokhovich, Parrino and 
Trapani, 1996). Thus, we include these two proxies to investigate if firms with powerful CEOs and 
entrenched boards are more likely to grant MAP plans. 
Not supporting this view, Table 3 shows that CEO tenure is not correlated with MAP plan uses, and 
boards with lower percentages of inside directors are more likely to grant MAP plans.19 In untabulated 
 
19 Some studies suggest that insider dominated boards can be optimal for large and complex firms since they provide 
more expertise in the advisory role (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008)). In untabulated test, we investigate whether 
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results, we use the factor analysis method to compute a factor score of CEO power based on board 
independence, CEO tenure and CEO ownership for each firm-year observation. We include CEO 
ownership as Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) suggest that board monitoring is weaker when the CEO has 
higher ownership.  When we replace the three individual variables with the CEO power factor score, the 
regression coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, which again is inconsistent 
with the argument that MAP plans are a rent-seeking tool for powerful CEOs.   We also find that the 
probability of granting a MAP plan is 6.4% lower for firm with retiring CEOs than firms without, as these 
CEOs may not stay till the end of the long-term performance period.  The coefficient of new CEO dummy 
is negative and significant at the 10% level, suggesting MAP grants are not driven by turnover events.  
Models (2) to (4) in Table 3 present the results of several robustness checks. In model (2), we exclude 
62 firms that grant their CEOs MAP plans only once in the sample period to control for the possibility 
that significant corporate events, such as mergers and acquisitions, had driven these one-time grants. As 
shown in Figure 3, the largest annual increase in the percentage of firms that adopt MAP plans is from 
2005 to 2006, with an increase of 6.59%. This increase coincides with the 2006 SEC requirements of 
enhanced disclosure of executive compensation contracts.20 To make sure that our results are not driven 
by changes in disclosure requirements, we repeat our regression in the sub-period of 1996 to 2005 and 
present the result in model (3).  The target payouts of MAP grants vary across firms and may contain 
information on the importance of the contracts.  In model (4), we use the target MAP payout as a 
 
our result on board independence is driven by corporate governance or firm complexity. We first regress the inside 
director ratio on proxies for firm complexity, firm size and the number of business segments, and use the regression 
residual to replace inside director percentage in the probit regression. The coefficient on the residual remains 
negative and highly significant (p-value=0.000), suggesting that the negative coefficient on the board insider 
percentage is unlikely to be driven by complex firms. 
20 In October 1992, the SEC adopted amendments to disclosure rules that require companies to disclose all elements 
of compensation in formatted tables, including the element’s relation to firm performance. In 2006, the SEC further 
enhanced disclosure rules to request that firms disclose performance plans under the “Grants of Plan-Based Awards” 
table. It is possible that a small percentage of firms neglected to report MAP plans prior to 2006 and subsequently 
improved disclosure under the new rules. However, we believe that such reporting violation should be rare given 
that our sample mainly consists of S&P 500 firms. Moreover, the discussion from SEC staff on compensation 
disclosure showed that the agency was not concerned about firms’ neglecting to disclose performance-based plans 
under the 1992 rules (http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch102004alb.htm).  
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percentage of total compensation as the dependent variable, and estimate a Tobit regression using the 
same set of explanatory variables. Results in models (2) to (4) are similar to those in the baseline model.  
5. Design of MAP plans 
In this section we examine four features of MAP plans: the choice of a specific accounting 
performance measure, the length of the performance period, the decision to use relative performance 
evaluation against a peer group, and the award type (cash vs. stock). We develop hypotheses based on 
predictions from contracting theories, which suggest that contract features should reflect each firm’s 
characteristics, strategic imperatives, and shareholder preferences. When applicable, we also examine 
whether powerful CEOs would tweak the contract design to benefit themselves. We summarize the 
hypotheses discussed in this section in panel A of Table 4. 
5.1. Selection of performance criteria 
As shown in Panel D of Table 1, firms use a variety of accounting measures in MAP plans. In this 
section, we examine the determinants of the four most widely-used types of performance measures that 
MAP plans based on: (1) earnings, (2) sales, (3) cash-flow, and (4) EVA. The literature suggests that the 
selection of performance criteria is affected by the informativeness (signal quality) of each measure and 
the firm’s strategic imperatives (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979; Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Ittner, Larcker, and 
Rajan, 1997). Firms are less likely to use a volatile performance measure because of its low signal quality 
(e.g., Holmstrom, 1979; Lambert and Larcker, 1987). A firm may also choose a performance measure to 
implement important corporate strategies and improve long-term survival (e.g., Salter, 1973; Ittner et al., 
1997). More specifically, companies that spend heavily on advertising and sales may care more about 
revenue growth and include it as a performance criterion. Firms with higher bankruptcy risk would pay 
more attention to cash flow measures to maintain sufficient liquidity. EVA related criteria can better 
assess the efficiency of a firm’s capital investment decisions.  We thus expect capital-intensive firms to be 
more likely to use EVA-based measures as they may be more concerned about investment efficiency.  
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Panel B of Table 4 presents the probit regression results for the determinants of choosing the four 
performance criteria respectively. We run the regressions for firm-year observations with a MAP grant. In 
column (1) to (4), the dependent variable is a binary variable that equals one if the MAP plan uses the 
performance measure specified in the column head and zero otherwise. Performance volatility is the 
standard deviation of the respective performance values over the past five years scaled by previous year’s 
performance. More specifically, we use ROAs for earnings-based plans, sales for sales-based plans, 
operating cash-flow for cash flow based plans, and return on invested capital (ROIC) for EVA-based 
plans. Supporting the “signal quality” hypothesis, the coefficients on performance volatility are negative 
and statistically significant for all four performance measures. 
We then examine whether firms choose certain performance criterion to match their strategic 
imperatives.  Column (2) of Panel B shows that firms spending heavily on advertising and SG&A are 
more likely to include sales-based performance measures in MAP contracts. In column (3), we find that 
firms with higher Ohlson's O-Score, a proxy for bankruptcy risk, are more likely to use cash-flow 
measures in MAP plans.21 We use the value of net property, plant and equipment divided by total asset to 
measure a company’s capital intensity and separate firms into top and bottom quartiles based on their 
capital intensities. Column (4) shows that the coefficient on the bottom quartile dummy is negative and 
statistically significant, indicating that firms with relatively low levels of fixed investments are less likely 
to choose EVA measures in MAP plans. We do not find that capital intensive firms use more EVA 
measures, as the coefficient on the top quartile dummy is not statistically different from zero.  
For each accounting measure, we include the firm’s past year performance percentile rank in the 
firm’s Fama-French 48 industry and the interaction between the performance rank and CEO power as 
additional independent variables in the regressions.  The predictions on past performance ranks are 
ambiguous: A firm may prefer a measure with poor past performance because the area needs 
improvement, or it may choose a measure with good past performance as it is the firm’s long-term 
 
21 We find similar results when using the Altman Z-Score and interest coverage ratio as alternative proxies for 
bankruptcy risk.  
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strategic focus. Panel B shows that, for all four measures, the coefficients on the past performance ranks 
are insignificant. We next examine if powerful CEOs try to “time” a measure based on past performance.  
When interacting the performance ranks with the CEO power factor, the coefficient on the interaction 
term is negative for earnings- and EVA-based MAP plans, but is positive for sales- and cash flow based 
plans. None of the coefficients is statistically significant at the conventional level. Thus, we do not find 
evidence that powerful CEOs choose a measure based on its past performance.  
5.2. Performance benchmark 
In this section, we investigate firms’ choice between relative vs. absolute performance benchmarks. 
Panel C of Table 1 shows that within firms that explicitly disclose MAP plan performance benchmarks, 
1,224 plans use an absolute value and 311 plans use at least one relative measure, where the accounting 
performance is benchmarked against that of peer companies or an index. We draw our hypothesis from 
the literature studying relative performance evaluation (RPE) to examine whether the design of MAP 
plans is consistent with predictions of contracting theories.  
Like the choice of performance criteria, the likelihood of using RPE also depends on whether RPE 
provides a better signal of managerial efforts and is consistent with firms’ strategic imperatives. Gibbons 
and Murphy (1992) argue that RPE would insulate executives from common exogenous risk and provide 
a more informative evaluation of their efforts. Based on the argument, we expect that RPE would be more 
useful when firm performance is heavily influenced by common factors. Next, we investigate the relation 
between industry competition and the likelihood of including RPE in MAP contracts. Aggarwal and 
Samwick (1999) and Joh (1999) argue that RPE could induce harmful competitive behavior in highly 
competitive industries. On the other hand, DeFond and Park (1999) and Gong, Li and Shin (2011) suggest 
that there are greater benefits of using RPE in competitive industries because of a higher degree of 
common risk in these industries. Thus, whether firms are more or less likely to use RPE in MAP contracts 
in competitive industries becomes an empirical question. Lastly, we examine if powerful CEOs are less 
likely to include RPE in MAP contracts as benchmarking would eliminate the benefit of positive 
exogenous shock (e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001).    
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Panel C of Table 4 presents the probit regression results on the decision to use RPE. The dependent 
variable is set to one if the MAP plan contains at least one accounting criterion with RPE. We use the 
correlation between a firm’s return on asset (ROA) and the industry’s asset weighted average ROA over 
the past five years to measure the impact of common industry shock. The significant positive coefficient 
in column (1) confirms that firms which co-move more with the industry are more likely to use RPE to 
filter out common shocks. Inside director ratio and CEO tenure are unrelated to the use of RPE in MAP 
plans. In column (2), we find weak evidence that powerful CEOs are less likely to receive MAP plans 
with RPE, where the coefficient on the CEO power factor is negative and statistically significant at the 10% 
level. We use the Herfindahl index based on the Fama-French 48 industries to measure industry 
competitiveness. Since the index is an industry-level variable, we present the regression models without 
industry dummies in column (3) and (4). Consistent with the argument in DeFond and Park (1999) and 
Gong et al. (2011), the coefficient on the Herfindahl index is negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  
5.3. Performance evaluation period 
While the majority of MAP plans evaluate CEO performance over a three-year performance period, 
there is still some degree of variation in the length, ranging from 1.5 years to 10 years. In this section, we 
explore factors that may influence the length of the performance evaluation period. Firstly, we expect 
firms with volatile performance to prefer longer periods to more accurately evaluate CEOs. Secondly, 
firms with more long-term shareholders may prefer longer evaluation periods to align the horizon of 
CEOs with that of shareholders (e.g., Stein, 1996; Bolton, et al., 2006). Thirdly, firms with more long-
term investment projects that take years to bear results may prefer longer periods (Larcker, 1983).  
We present the Tobit regression results on the determinants of the length of the performance period in 
column (1) of Panel D. The dependent variable is the number of performance years specified in MAP 
plans. As expected, firms are more likely to choose longer performance periods as earnings volatility, 
measured as the standard deviation of ROA in the past five years, increases. The coefficient on the bottom 
quartile turnover dummy is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that firms prefer a longer 
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evaluation period when there are more long-term shareholders. The coefficient on the top quartile 
turnover dummy is negative as predicted, but not statistically significant.  Firms with high capital 
expenditure to asset ratios are more likely to choose longer evaluation periods, while the coefficient on 
the R&D to asset ratio is insignificant. Overall, our results show that the length of the performance period 
is influenced by performance volatility and capital expenditures. 
5.4. MAP award type 
The expected contingent payment from a MAP plan can be expressed as a fixed-value cash award 
(41.5%), a fixed-share stock award (55.3%), or a mixture of both (3.2%). In proxy statements, companies 
often claim that they choose stock-based MAP awards to ensure that CEOs will own a required amount of 
company stocks. Thus, we expect that firms are more likely to use stock-based MAP contracts when the 
CEO’s equity ownership is low. We also expect that financially constrained firms and firms that grant 
MAP plans with a large target payment would prefer stock-based grants over cash-based ones, as the 
latter could impose significant liability on the firm’s cash balance.  
We present the probit regression results on the determinants of firm’s choice of the award type in the 
second column of Panel D in Table 4. The dependent variable is a binary variable that equals one if the 
expected award is stock-based. The coefficient on CEO stock ownership at the beginning of the year is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting an increased probability of granting 
stock-based MAP plans when the CEO’s stock ownership is low. We define a firm as financially 
unconstrained if the firm has non-default bond ratings and has a payout ratio in the top quartile within our 
sample (e.g., Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Denis and Sibikov, 2010). As expected, the 
coefficient on the financially unconstrained dummy is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Supporting the argument that firms would prefer stock-based grants when the target payment is large, we 
find a positive coefficient on the ratio of target payout to total assets.   
In summary, we find that the MAP contract design is generally consistent with predictions from 
contracting theories. Firms design different aspects of MAP plans based on the signal quality of 
performance measures, firms’ strategic imperatives, and shareholder preferences. Our analysis on MAP 
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design is done for firm-year observations with MAP grants. Theoretically, some unobservable firm 
characteristics may influence a firm’s decision to grant a plan as well as the specific features of MAP 
contracts, resulting in a self-selection bias in the analysis. Even though it is unlikely that certain factor 
could bias all our findings in a systematic way that exactly fit our hypotheses, the results should be 
interpreted with caution as the analysis is conditional on firms choosing MAP plans.22  
6. The time series trend of MAP incentives 
Figure 3.A shows that the percentage of firms that adopt MAP plans does not vary much from 1998 
to 2001, but increases monotonically afterward.  This kink in MAP adoptions coincides with several 
major events: (1) the burst of the stock bubble that raised investors’ awareness of the signal quality of 
stock performance, (2) firms’ starting to expense stock options, and (3) option backdating scandals that 
further changed investors’ views unfavorably towards option grants. Firms could rationally adjust their 
incentive design in response to changes in contracting environment, or blindly follow the trend regardless 
of their characteristics and shareholder preferences. To better understand the motivations behind the time 
series trend of MAP plans, we compare the determinants of granting MAP incentives before and after 
2002, study the characteristics of the firms that initiate MAP plans after 2002, and assess factors that may 
have motivated these firms to adopt MAP incentives. 
6.1. The determinants of granting MAP incentives before and after 2002 
To investigate if companies blindly follow the trend and grant MAP plans regardless of firm 
characteristics after 2002, we repeat the analysis of MAP plan adoptions in Table 3 for two sub-periods: 
1996 to 2001 and 2002 onward. To preserve space, we only report coefficients of the interest variables in 
Table 5. But all regressions include the same set of control variables as in Table 3. The first two columns 
in Panel A of Table 5 show that for both periods, the sign and significance of the coefficients of the 
 
22 In untabulated robustness tests, we find similar result when using the Heckman (1979) two-stage treatment effects 
estimation to control for self-selection on observables. Specifically, we use the same probit model as in Table 3 to 
estimate the probability that a firm will grant a MAP plan in the first stage, and simultaneously estimate the design 
decisions conditional on the decision to grant a MAP plan. In addition, to address the possibility that these contract 
features are simultaneously determined, we estimate the contract design simultaneously as a system of seven 
equations and find qualitatively similar results.  
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interest variables are similar to earlier results. The key testing coefficients are not significantly different 
between the two sub-periods, except that the coefficient of inside director ratio is significantly more 
negative in the latter period. This increased significance appears to be driven by a larger difference in 
inside director ratios between MAP-plan adopting firms and non-adopting firms as show in Panel E of 
Figure 6.  
Figure 3.B shows that the upward trend of MAP grants is mostly driven by the increasing usage of 
stock-based MAP plans, which suggests that firms do not shy away from incentives that are linked to 
stock performance after 2002. Instead, they are more likely to combine accounting- and stock-based 
incentives together in the post-bubble period. We test the motivations for granting MAP contracts with 
cash- or stock-based payouts for the pre- and post-2002 periods and present the results in columns (4) to 
(9) of Panel A in Table 5. The coefficients of the main interest variables, i.e. proxies for signal quality and 
shareholder horizon, remain significant for both award types in general. Firms with more independent 
boards are more likely to grant both cash- and stock-based MAP plans after 2002.  In Panel B of Table 5, 
we change the dependent variable to a magnitude variable that equals the MAP plan target payout divided 
by total CEO compensation. We estimate the regressions using a Tobit model and find similar results as 
those in Panel A.  Collectively, the results in Table 5 suggest that firms in general rationally consider their 
characteristics when granting MAP contracts both before and after 2002.   
6.2. Characteristics of MAP plan-adopting firms before and after 2002 
To further investigate what types of firms drive the growing popularity of MAP plans, we plot 
measures of performance signal quality, shareholder horizon, and board independence for firms that 
adopted MAP plans before 2002 and after 2002, as well as firms that have never used the plans.  As 
Figure 6 shows, the pre-2002 “early” adopters on average have the highest stock to accounting volatility 
ratios, more business segments, the lowest sales growth rates, the lowest average monthly stock turnovers 
and the most independent boards.  These firms are likely to benefit the most from using long-term 
accounting-based performance to evaluate executives; therefore, they adopt MAP plans first. The post-
2002 “late” adopters lag behind in accounting signal quality, and they have relatively shorter shareholder 
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horizons and less independent boards. Meanwhile, firms that have never adopted a MAP plan in general 
have the shortest shareholder horizons, lowest accounting signal quality, and the least independent boards. 
These firms would not benefit from accounting-based incentives and their shareholders have a short-term 
focus, therefore they do not flock to MAP plans despite the trend.  
6.3. Changes in the contracting environment and the growth of MAP plans 
In this section, we examine what factors have prompted the “late adopters” that were previously on 
the fence to start adopting MAP incentives after 2002. Following Bizjak, Lemmon and Whitby (2009), 
we rely on a multi-period logit regression to identify factors that contribute to the spread of MAP 
incentives in the post-2002 period. The dependent variable is set to 1 in the year that a firm grants MAP 
incentives for the first time in the post-2002 period. After the initial adoption, the firm will be dropped 
from the sample in subsequent years. The dependent variable is set to zero for firm-year observations 
prior to their respective MAP plan initiation year and for all firm-year observations of firms that never 
adopt a MAP plan. All observations of firms that have already adopted MAP plans before 2002 are not 
included in these logit regressions.  
We consider three major events in the early 2000s which have likely changed the compensation 
contracting environment and contributed to the spread of MAP incentives: the burst of the stock market 
bubble, the trend to expense option grants, and option backdating scandals.  First, the stock market bubble 
in the late 90’s and the subsequent burst of the bubble may have raised investors’ awareness that stock 
prices can deviate from fundamental values for a prolonged period of time. Firms that had elevated stock 
prices during the bubble period should be more likely to explore non-stock based performance measures 
to better evaluate CEOs. For each firm, we measure the degree of misevaluation during the bubble period 
as its average market to book equity ratio during the bubble period, 1997-1999, divided by the average 
market to book ratio in the pre-bubble period, 1994-1996. The results are presented in column (1) of 
Table 6. The coefficient of this bubble misevaluation measure is significantly positive with a p-value of 
0.05, suggesting that a firm’s valuation during the 1997-1999 periods strongly predicts whether it will 
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start granting MAP plans in the post-bubble period.23  
It is possible the CEOs may prefer accounting-based compensation incentives if they expect lower 
future stock returns in the post-bubble period. Not supporting this view, Figure 3.B indicates that firms do 
not shy away from equity-based pay after 2002 as the newly adopted MAP plans are mostly stock-based. 
Results presented in Section 6.1 (Table 5) also show that firms’ decisions to grant stock-based MAP plans 
continue to depend on accounting signal quality and shareholder horizon after 2002. Together, the 
evidence suggests that firms with elevated valuation during the bubble period are subsequently more 
willing to combine accounting signal with stock performance as long-term incentives. 
Next, we investigate whether the change in accounting practice on option expensing affects firms’ 
decision to adopt MAP plans. Before 2002, firms can choose to follow APB opinion No. 25 and expense 
option grants at their “intrinsic value”, which is normally zero as the option exercise prices are usually set 
to equal to the grant date market prices. However, the trend started to change from the summer of 2002. 
More than 150 firms chose to voluntarily expense option grants at “grant date fair value” in 2002 and 
early 2003 (Aboody et al., 2004). Later, FASB announced mandatory fair value expensing of option 
grants under the FASB ASC Topic 718, effective for fiscal years starting after June 15, 2005.24 Before the 
accounting practice change, firms could use option grants to defer compensation costs and improve 
reported earnings in the current period.  This expensing advantage of option grants would be especially 
attractive to firms that are barely profitable as any small changes in their expenses could swing 
profitability out of or into the negative zone. We expect these firms to start switching to other types of 
compensation incentives after the expensing benefit of options is gone. We identify firms that are likely to 
suffer “large option expensing effect” as those with an average net profit margin between -0.03 to +0.03 
 
23 In untabulated robustness test, we re-estimate the “bubble misevaluation” variable using the “misevaluation” 
component of the market to book equity ratio as defined in Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) and 
Hertzel and Li (2010) and find similar results.  
24 The new FASB rule also changed the expensing method of equity-based pay from “variable” accounting (under 
APB 25) to fair-market-value accounting. This new method is considered more advantageous than the “variable” 
expensing because firms do not need to record additional expenses when stock price increases (Murphy, 2012). 
Moreover, firms have more flexibility on how much to expense by considering the performance vesting conditions 
and choosing their own valuation models. Thus, the FASB rule change may have further increased the attractiveness 
of non-option equity pay, including stock based MAP plans. 
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from 2000 to 2002. As expected, results presented in column (2) of Table 6 show that these firms are 
more likely to initiate MAP grants after 2002. We obtain similar results if we change the average net 
profit margin criteria to negative or between -0.05 to +0.05.  The results are also robust if we impose an 
additional requirement that the total value of option grants to all top executives accounts for more than 5% 
of the firm’s net income.  
Lastly, we examine if the breakout of option backdating scandals facilitates MAP plan adoptions. In 
July 2002, congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which inadvertently eliminated option backdating by 
requiring companies to disclose new option grants within two business days. In late 2005 and early 2006, 
the practice of option backdating attracted wide public attention after the publication of Lie (2005) and 
subsequent coverage by the Wall Street Journal.25 We first examine whether companies that potentially 
engaged in option backdating before 2002 would subsequently switch to MAP incentives. Following 
Bizjak et al. (2009), we identify an unscheduled option grant as being manipulated if the cumulative 
return during twenty days before and twenty days after the option grant date is higher than the cutoff 
points of a 95% confidence level conditional on the monthly standard deviation of returns over the two-
year period preceding the option grant date. 26   Firms with at least one option grant identified as 
manipulated before 2002 would be classified as an option backdater. As shown in column 3 of Table 6, 
the coefficient on the option backdater dummy is positive but insignificant, suggesting that the probability 
of initiating MAP plans after 2002 is not significantly higher for pre-2002 option backdaters. Given that 
option backdating scandals are publicized in 2005 and early 2006, we next examine if firms in industries 
that had more publicized scandals are more likely to initiate MAP incentives after 2005. We construct a 
“High Glass-Lewis Industry” indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s industry has more than five 
 
25 Wall Street Journal (March 2006), “The Perfect Payday,” by Forelle and Bandler.  
26 We use the same cutoff points for the 95% confidence level as in Bizjak et al. (2009), which is generated from a 
randomly selected 500,000 trading days from a sample of 5,716 firms covered by the Thomson Financial Insider 
Filing database. Our results are similar if we use the cutoff points of 99% or 97.5% confidence levels.  We follow 
Lie (2005) to identify unscheduled options and their grant dates. 
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firms identified by the Glass-Lewis report as option backdaters.27 Firms in these industries have more 
incentives to differentiate themselves by switching away from option grants. We rerun the multi-period 
logit regression from 2006 onward with the High Glass-Lewis Industry indictor variable. As shown in 
column (4) of Table 6, the coefficient on the “High Glass-Lewis Industry” variable is positive and 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that the publicity of option backdating scandal has prompted more 
firms to seek alternative incentives, including the MAP plans. 
In columns (5) and (6) of table 6, we include in one regression the proxies related to the stock bubble, 
the change in option expensing, and option backdating scandals and find similar results as discussed 
above. Together, the findings suggest that the time-series trend of MAP incentives after 2002 is related to 
the changes in contracting environment that were onset since the beginning of 2000s.   
6.4. MAP plans’ substitution for option grants  
The expensing rule change and the unfavorable sentiment towards stock options after the uncovering 
of option backdating scandals have likely increased the perceived costs of using option grants and 
promoted more firms to adopt MAP incentives. Moreover, many firms disclose in proxy statements that 
they cut down stock options when adopting MAP plans to make sure that CEO total compensation is not 
inflated. 28  These arguments suggest that firms may use MAP plans to replace option grants. In this 
section, we empirically examine this premise. 
       To study the relation between MAP plans and option grants, we first conduct a baseline test by 
regressing option grants scaled by CEO total pay on the binary variable that equals one if firms grant a 
new MAP plan that year and zero otherwise. We control for firm and CEO characteristics that have been 
shown to relate to the percentage of option grants, as well as industry and year fixed effect.  As shown in 
Panel A of Table 7, the results indicate a significant cross-sectional difference in option grants between 
 
27 The Glass, Lewis & Co. Yellow Card Trend Alert Report was released on June 14, 2007. The report compiled 257 
companies that have announced SEC inquiries, Justice Department subpoenas, earnings restatements, or internal 
reviews related to historical option grants. In total, there are 13 of 48 Fama and French industries have more than 
five firms identified in the Glass-Lewis report. 
28 For example, in 2004 Amgen Inc. initiated a three-year MAP plan contingent on EPS and revenue growth as long-
term incentives. The firm also announced significant reduction in stock option grants, “such that the combination of 
the two grants yields an award value comparable to previous year’s grants consisting solely of stock options.” 
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firm-year observations with a MAP plan and those without. Column (1) shows that when there is a new 
MAP grant, the ratio of CEO’s option grants to total pay is 5.4% lower, which is a 15.6% drop based on 
the median option percentage of 34.7%. In column (2) and (3), we find similar patterns of reduction in 
option grants when using the MAP plan coverage dummy or the magnitude of MAP plan as a percentage 
of total pay as independent variables. Columns (4) to (6) show that both cash- and stock-based MAP 
awards are negatively associated with a lower percentage of option grants in CEO pay, with firms 
granting stock-based MAP plans experiencing more significant reductions in options after 2002. Taken 
together, the evidence indicates that firms with MAP plans use significantly fewer option-based 
incentives.  
Firms that use MAP plans could be fundamentally different from firms that do not use these plans and 
thus grant fewer stock options in the first place. To investigate whether firms reduce the use of stock 
options after granting MAP plans, we compute within-firm changes in option grants as a percentage of 
total pay for MAP-plan granting firms for three event windows—pre-grant year to grant year, grant year 
+1, and grant year +2. We focus on these three event windows because more than 80% of the MAP plans 
in our sample have a three-year performance period. As shown in Panel B of Table 7, the percentage of 
option grants increases significantly after granting MAP plans in the 1996 to 2001 period, indicating that 
MAP plans and stock options are complements rather than substitutes before 2002. However, the trend 
reversed in the post-2002 period.  Firms use significantly fewer stock options after both cash- and stock-
based MAP grants. The percentage of option grants reduces the most by 0.091 in the third year after 
granting stock-based MAP plans, a 31% reduction based on the average percentage of option grants 
(0.296) in the MAP-plan granting sample. When focusing on firm-year observations that grant stock-
based MAP plans for the first time, i.e., initial MAP grants, the percentage of option grants reduces 
dramatically by 0.169 for the last event window, which is a 57% reduction.   
The univariate comparisons in Panel B cannot control for an overall declining trend of option grants 
for all U.S. public firms. To address this issue, we use a difference in difference approach to control for 
the general trend in option grants and isolate the changes that are more relevant to MAP grants. For each 
31 
 
MAP-plan granting firm-year observation, we identify a matching observation from the Execucomp 
universe using a propensity score matching approach. We use the probit model in Table 3 to estimate the 
propensity score for each firm year. For each MAP plan-granting firm-year observation, we identify a 
matching firm in the same year and Fama-French 12 industry, has the closest propensity score, and is not 
in our sample of MAP-plan granting firms. We find matching firms for 1,597 MAP plan-granting firm-
year observations.29 To ensure the match quality of the propensity score approach, we compare firm 
characteristics between MAP plan-granting firm years and matched peers and find no statistically 
significant difference between the two groups. 
After identifying the matched peers, we subtract the within-firm changes in the percentage of option 
grants of matching firms from those of the MAP-plan granting firms for the same event window.  Panel C 
of Table 7 reports the diff-in-diff results for both the whole MAP plan-granting sample and for sub-
samples separated by award type and sample period. Compared with matching peers, firms experience 
significantly post-grant drop in option grants after granting stock-based MAP plans in the post-2002 
period. However, firms granting cash-based MAP plans experience similar post-grant changes in option 
awards as matched firms. Consistent with the trend documented in Panel B of Figure 3, firms increasingly 
use stock-based MAP plans to replace option grants. Firms do not flock to cash-based MAP plans even 
though cash-based contracts with pure accounting criteria generally have more favorable accounting 
treatment after 2002. Instead, more companies choose to use stock-based MAP plans that combine 
accounting criteria with stock performance to provide more balanced long-term incentives.30 
 
29 Out of the 1,936 MAP plans, we lost 34 plans due to missing compensation information and 216 plans due to 
CEO turnovers that result in incomplete compensation information to calculate the changes in compensation from 
pre-grant year to post-grant years. We further exclude 55 plans that do not have enough firm information to generate 
the propensity score and another 34 plans whose propensity score deviates more than +/- 20% from that of the 
MAP-plan granting observation. Thus, the final sample for the propensity score matched comparison of option 
grants is 1,597 pairs.   
30 The propensity score matching results are robust if we (i) estimate the diff-in-diff using three matches with the 
closest propensity scores to MAP plan-granting firms or (ii) use a caliper match approach where the control firms’ 
propensity scores are within the range of +/- 5% of the firms with MAP grants. We also obtain similar results when 
we identify control firms using a characteristic matching method, where, for each firm-year observation with a new 
MAP grant, we obtain a control firm-year observation in the same year and Fama and French 12 industry, the same 
option% decile and with the closet market capitalization. One potential caveat of our matching method is that when 
the control firm is not in our sample of S&P 500 firms, we do not know whether the control firm has granted a MAP 
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7. MAP plans and total compensation 
Both the cross-sectional and time-series analyses on the decision to grant MAP plans are largely 
consistent with the view that firms use MAP plans to improve incentive alignment between CEOs and 
shareholder.  Powerful executives, however, may use MAP plans to extract rents by setting low 
performance hurdles and/or lucrative payoffs on top of their already competitive pay packages. To assess 
this agency problem based explanation, we investigate whether CEOs with MAP plans receive higher pay. 
To investigate whether the usage of MAP plans relates to CEO total pay, we first regress CEO total 
compensation on a binary variable that equals one if the firm grants a new MAP plan that year. To control 
for unobservable firm characteristics, we include firm fixed effects in the regression. We also control for 
CEO characteristics, corporate governance, firm’s current and lagged stock and accounting performances, 
year fixed effects, as well as firm size in a non-parametric manner using decile dummy variables.  Panel 
A of Table 8 present the regressions results. The coefficient on MAP grant dummy is insignificant (p-
value = 0.97), suggesting that changes in pay are comparable between CEOs receiving MAP grants and 
those do not. When separating MAP grants based on time periods and award type, we confirm that CEOs 
with either cash- or stock- based MAP grants do not earn more than their counterparts in both pre- and 
post-2002 periods.  
Next we directly compare within-firm changes in CEO total pay after receiving a MAP plan between 
plan-granting firms and a group of matched firms. We identify matched peers using the same propensity 
score matching method as described in Section 6.4.  As shown in Panel B of Table 8, the changes in CEO 
total compensation are not different between MAP plan-granting firms and control firms for all event 
windows and for both cash- and stock-based plans in both the pre- and post-2002 periods. This evidence 
suggests that the growing popularity of MAP plans is unlikely to be an outcome of CEOs’ rent-seeking 
behavior. 
 
plan.  The benefit of drawing control firms from Execucomp is that doing so allows better match quality on firm 
characteristics. Nevertheless, we repeat the tests by drawing control firms within our sample firms and obtain 
qualitatively similar results. 
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We conduct several robustness checks in untabulated tests. Because CEO total compensation is 
strongly related to firm performance and size, we repeat tests in Panel B by replacing CEO total pay with 
excess pay, measured as the residual from regressing total compensation on the firm’s current and lagged 
accounting and stock performances, size and other characteristics, and find similar results as those 
presented in Panel B of Table 8. To address the possibility that the impact of MAP grants may not be 
fully captured in the grant year’s total compensation, we replace the MAP grant dummy with a cover 
dummy that equals one for all performance years covered by a MAP grant and obtain similar results. In 
addition, the results are also robust if we use a characteristic matching approach to select matched firms 
from same industry and with the closest market capitalization and pre-grant compensation level.  
Overall, our analysis on post-grant changes in compensation suggests that MAP-plan granting firms 
do not pay their CEOs more than their matched peers.  Unlike the earlier regime shift in compensation 
design towards stock options in the ‘90s, the current shift towards MAP incentives is accompanied by a 
simultaneous reduction in stock options, resulting in changes in the structure of CEO ex-ante incentives, 
but not in target pay level. Collectively, these results are more consistent with the view that MAP 
incentives are adopted to improve incentive alignment instead of extract rents.   
8. Conclusion 
While MAP plans have become one of the most significant components of CEO expected pay, they 
have not been systematically studied.  We know little about the contract details of MAP plans, the 
motivations for using them, their growing importance in incentive design, and whether they are a rational 
choice made by firms or just another trendy tool for CEOs to extract rent.  Our paper provides first sets of 
evidence on these issues.  
We document the richness of the MAP contract design and study why firms use MAP incentives. Our 
results suggest that the grant decision and the design of MAP incentives are shaped by the reliability of 
stock and accounting performances to reflect managerial efforts, shareholder preferences and firm 
characteristics. Independent boards are more likely to grant MAP incentives, while CEO power does not 
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increase the likelihood of adopting MAP incentives or relate much to the plan design.  CEOs with MAP 
plans do not receive higher pay than their matched peers. These results suggest that firms use MAP plans 
to better align managerial incentives with shareholders’ rather than enrich powerful CEOs. 
The stock market bubble, accounting rule change in option expensing, and option backdating scandals 
changed investors’ view on the signal quality of stock prices, the perceived costs of option grants, and 
market sentiment towards option grants. In response to these external changes in the contracting 
environment, more firms start to use stock-based MAP plans in place of option grants so as to combine 
both stock and accounting performance signals to better evaluate CEOs.  Our findings also show that 
firms do not blindly cater to the trend of using MAP plans, they consider their own characteristics and 
grant MAP plans when doing so is mostly likely to improve incentive alignment between CEOs and 
shareholders.  
Future research on MAP incentives could further our understanding of these plans and their impact. 
For example, how firms set performance hurdles, the actual plan payouts, and policy implications of using 
MAP incentives. Moreover, MAP plans, together with other performance plans, have significantly 
changed the ex-ante incentives faced by CEOs. Omitting these imbedded performance provisions would 
result in a biased estimate of executive pay sensitivity to firm performance and volatility. It challenges 
researchers to development more comprehensive ex-ante incentive measures that could adequately 
capture performance incentives’ sensitivity to both accounting and stock performances. Moreover, it 
could also be potentially fruitful for researchers to consider all four spectrums of compensation contracts 
as shown in Figure 1, because more and more firms are combining them to improve overall compensation 
design.  
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Appendix A. An example of MAP plans - Boeing Co31  
Starting in 2006, Boeing Co initiated a new long-term incentive program based on three-year economic 
profits.  Boeing Co’s proxy statement stated that the new performance plan, together with stock options, 
“is designed to promote sustained shareholder value creation and provide a balanced focus on driving 
internal and external performance through the achievement of internal goals relative to our long-range 
business plan and long-term stock price appreciation.” 
The details of the features of the plan are as follows:  
“Performance Awards reward executives based on the achievement of long-term financial 
goals at the end of a three-year performance period.  For the 2006–2008 performance 
period, economic profit goals were set based on the Company’s long-range business plan.  
Individual target awards are based on a multiple of base salary (set for each pay grade), 
which is then converted into a number of units. 
   Each unit has an initial value of $100; 
  
 The amount payable at the end of the three-year performance period may be 
anywhere from $0 to $200 per unit, depending on our performance against 
plan for the period ending on December 31, 2008; 
   As a result, final awards may range from 0% to 200% of an individual’s 
target; and 
   Payment may be made in cash or stock (at the Committee’s discretion). 
Performance Awards are designed to pay out 100% of target at the end of the three-year 
performance cycle if the economic profit goals are achieved at the end of the performance 
period.  Final awards can range from 25% of target for threshold performance to 200% of 
target for maximum performance.  If the threshold level of performance is not achieved, 
no awards will be paid.  For levels of performance between threshold and target, and 
target and maximum, there will be a linear relationship.” 
Executive Name 
Performance 
Period 
Estimated Future Payouts Under Plan 
Threshold Target Maximum 
W. James McNerney, Jr. 
(CEO) 3 Years $1,421,875 $5,687,500 $11,375,000 
 
We record the 2006 plan of Boeing Co as follows: 
 Length of performance period: 3 years (1/1/2006 to 12/31/2008). 
 Award type: Cash. 
 Performance criteria: EVA based (economic profit). 
 Performance hurdle used: Unknown. 
 Award size: Threshold ($1,421,875); target ($5,687,500); maximum ($11,375,000). 
 
 
 
 
  
 
31 http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/12927/000119312507062748/ddef14a.htm 
36 
 
Appendix B.  Variable definitions and data sources 
Variables Sources Definitions 
Total Compensation ExecuComp Sum of cash compensation, restricted stock grants and
option grants, long-term incentive payouts, and all other
compensation (TDC1).  
Salary ExecuComp Base salary of the CEO during the fiscal year. 
Bonus ExecuComp Bonus earned by the CEO during the fiscal year. 
Option Grants ExecuComp The aggregate Black–Scholes value of stock options
granted the executive during the year. 
Restricted Stock Grants ExecuComp The value of restricted stock granted during the year
(determined as of the date of the grant). 
Stock Volatility/Earnings 
Volatility 
Compustat/CRSP Standard deviation of the past 60 months of stock returns
divided by the standard deviation of the past five years’
earnings.  Earnings are measured as income before
extraordinary items, scaled by book assets. 
# Business Segments Compustat Segment Number of segments that the firm operates in each fiscal
year. 
Sales Growth Compustat Annual sales growth rate. 
Average Monthly Stock 
Turnover  
CRSP The monthly trading volume divided by the number of
shares outstanding.  
Inside Director Ratio RiskMetrics and 
Proxy Statements 
The percentage of inside directors to the total number of
directors on the board. 
CEO Tenure ExecuComp Number of years served as the CEO.  
CEO Ownership ExecuComp The percentage of firm shares owned by the CEO. 
CEO Power Factor ExecuComp, 
RiskMetrics and 
Proxy Statements 
CEO power is a factor score computed from a factor
analysis of board independence, CEO tenure and CEO 
ownership.   
Retire Age (0/1) ExecuComp Dummy variable that equals 1 if CEO age ≥ 65 and zero 
otherwise. 
New CEO (0/1) ExecuComp Dummy variable that equals 1 if CEO tenure is no more 
than 2 years and zero otherwise.  
Board Size RiskMetrics and 
Proxy Statements 
The total number of directors on the board. 
Fiscal Year Stock Return CRSP Annual stock return in the fiscal year. 
ROA Compustat EBITDA divided by total assets.  
R&D/Total Assets Compustat R&D expenditures to book asset; set to zero if missing. 
ADV/Total Assets Compustat Advertising expenditures to book assets; set to zero if
missing. 
CapEx/Total Assets Compustat Capital expenditures to book assets. 
PPENT/Total Assets Compustat The net total value of Property, plant and equipment
divided by total assets. 
Institutional Holding Thomson Financial 
13-f filings 
The sum of institutional ownerships 
Market Cap ($ billions) Compustat Market capitalization is measured as the number of shares
outstanding multiplied by the stock price at the fiscal year-
end. 
Daily Return Volatility CRSP The standard deviation of daily stock returns in the fiscal
year multiplies the square root of 254. 
  (continued)
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Appendix B. Continued   
Performance Volatility Compustat To calculate performance volatility, we use the standard 
deviation of past five years’ ROAs for earnings-based 
plans, past sales for sales-based plans, past cash-flow for 
cash flow based plans, and return on invested capital
(ROIC) for EVA-based plans. ROIC is calculated as
EBIT(1-tax%)/Beginning of Year Total Invested Capital. 
(SG&A + Advertising)/ 
Total Assets 
Compustat Selling, general and administrative cost plus advertising
expenditures to book assets; set to zero if missing. 
O-score Compustat Ohlson (1980) measure of the likelihood of bankruptcy. 
Performance Rank Compustat The percentile rank of the firm’s past year performance in
the firm’s Fama-French 48 industry. We use past ROA for
earnings-based plans, past sales for sales-based plans, past 
cash-flow for cash flow based plans, and return on invested
capital (ROIC) for EVA-based plans. 
Earnings Volatility Compustat The standard deviation of ROA in the past five years. 
Correlation (ROA, 
INDROA) 
Compustat The correlation between the firm’s ROA and the industry’s 
asset weighted average ROA over the past five years. 
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Figure 1.  The Executive Incentive Compensation Design 
  
 
 
Figure 2. An Example:  The Coca-Cola Company 2006 Stock-based MAP Plan 
Panel A. MAP Plan Payout in Shares 
This figure presents the performance hurdles and the expected payout for each performance hurdle. 
 
 
Panel B. MAP Plan Payout in Dollars 
This figure presents how the expected payout from a stock-based MAP plan changes with the EPS growth rate and 
stock price.  
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Figure 3.  Time Series Trend of MAP Incentives 
Panel A. MAP Incentives Coverage from 1996 to 2008 
This graph presents the percentage of firms covered by a MAP plan from 1996 to 2008.  The sample includes 8,683 
firm–year observations that cover all S&P 500 firms from 1996 to 2008. 
 
 
Panel B. Award Types of MAP Plans from 1996 to 2008 
This graph presents the distribution of MAP plans by award types from 1996 to 2008.  The sample includes 8,683 
firm–year observations that cover all S&P 500 firms from 1996 to 2008. 
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Figure 4.  Industry Distributions of MAP Incentives 
Panel A. The Industry Distribution of MAP Incentives 
This graph presents, across different industries, the distribution of all 8,683 firm–years in our sample and the distribution of 2,463 firm–years covered by MAP 
plans from 1996 to 2008. 
  
 
Panel B. The Industry Distribution of MAP Incentives Before and After 2002 
This graph presents the industry distribution of 2,463 firm–years covered by MAP plans for two periods: 1996 to 2001, and from 2002 onward. 
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Figure 5. Comparison of the Magnitudes of MAP Incentives and Option Grants 
Panel A. The Time Series Trend of MAP Incentives and Option Grants ($) 
This graph compares the annual averages of the expected target payouts of MAP plans to the annual averages of 
option grants from 1996 to 2008.  The sample includes 8,418 firm–year observations that cover all firms that once 
appeared in the S&P 500 index from 1996 to 2008 and have related compensation data from the ExecuComp.  All 
values are in 2007 dollars. 
 
Panel B. The Time Series Trend of MAP Incentives and Option Grants (%) 
This graph compares the annual averages between MAP target payout as a percentage of total compensation and 
option grant as a percentage total compensation. 
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Figure 6. Firm Characteristics of MAP Adopters and Non-adopters 
These graphs presents the time-series values of firm characteristics for firms that adopted MAP plans before 2002 
(Pre-2002 Adopters), after 2002 (Post-2002 Adopters), and for firms that never adopted a MAP plan (Non-adopters) 
during the sample period. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of MAP Incentives 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the 1,936 MAP grants of all S&P 500 firms from 1996 to 2008. All 
values are in 2007 dollar values.  
Panel A.  The Length of Performance Period 
  Obs. % of Total MAP Grants 
1<#Years<2 4 0.21 
2≤#Years<3 152 7.85 
#Years=3 1,604 82. 85 
#Years=4 110 5.68 
#Years≥5 57 2.94 
Unknown 9 0.46 
Panel B.  Award Types     Panel C. Performance Benchmark 
 Obs. 
% of Total MAP 
Grants   Obs. 
% of Total MAP 
Grants 
Cash 803 41.48 Absolute Measures  1,224  63.22 
Shares 1,070 55.27 Relative Measures   311  16.06 
Option 1 0.05 Unknown  401  20.71 
Mixed Cash/Shares/Options 62 3.20 
Panel D.  Performance Criteria 
  
% of MAP Grants 
Using the Measure 
% of MAP Grants Using 
the Measure Only 
% of MAP Grants with  
Stock Performance 
Requirements 
Earnings 83.42 56.15 16.84 
Sales 16.12 0.62 3.62 
Cash Flow 8.83 4.08 1.19 
EVA 8.21 2.17 2.17 
Other Accounting 10.80 2.53 3.10 
Unknown 1.45 0.62 0.26 
Panel E. MAP Grants Award Size and Other Compensation Components (in $000’s) 
Variable     Obs.      Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std Dev 
Firm-year Observations with MAP Incentives      
MAP Award (Target) 1,864 2,154.903 1,406.081 18,614.650 64.898 2,508.276 
MAP Award (Max) 1,736 3,891.453 2,653.588 31,292.630 129.795 4,316.385 
MAP Award (Threshold) 1,150 729.098 471.383 5,804.110 1.120 890.481 
Total Compensation 1,921 9646.139 7252.427 54,891.550 322.880 8318.194 
Salary 1,921 1117.975 1061.410 2,584.620 0.001 348.477 
Bonus 1,921 1227.655 782.113 9,465.060 0.000 1582.699 
Option Grant 1,921 3342.306 1976.099 38,904.750 0.000 5039.926 
Restricted Stock Grant 1,921 1848.256 63.655 15,465.380 0.000 3053.697 
Whole Sample       
Total Compensation 8,418 9,261.560 6,098.620 54,891.550 322.880 9,866.750 
SALARY 8,418 977.457 970.425 2,584.620 0.001 410.157 
BONUS 8,418 1,206.160 673.379 9,465.060 0.000 1,709.960 
Option Grant 8,418 4,194.040 1,969.390 38,904.750 0.000 6,739.200 
Restricted Stock Grant 8,418 1,389.580 0.000 15,465.380 0.000 2,889.940 
 
 
Table 2.  Summary Statistics of Firm Characteristics 
This table presents summary statistics for 8,418 firm–year observations of all S&P 500 firms that have compensation information from 1996 to 2008.  The binary 
variable, MAP Grant, equals one if the firm grants a new MAP plan in that year and zero otherwise. The right part of the table presents summary statistics for 
2,440 firm–year observations that are covered by MAP grants and 5,978 firm–year observations that are not covered by any MAP grant.  The p-values for the 
differences in means are based on t-tests for the two sample means and the p-values for the differences in the medians are based on non-parametric Wilcoxon 
rank sum tests.  See Appendix B for variable definitions.  
       Firm Years w/ MAP Firm Years w/o MAP Mean Diff Median Diff 
Variable N Mean Median 10% 90% Std. Dev. N Mean Median N Mean Median  (p-value)  (p-value) 
MAP Grant (0/1) (%) 8,418 22.820             
MAP Cover (0/1) (%) 8,418 28.986             
Stock Vol./Earnings Vol. 8,133 7.174 4.184 1.734 14.734 9.090 2,368 8.338 4.466 5,765 6.696 4.054 0.000 0.000 
# Business Segments 8,418 2.294 2.000 1.000 5.000 1.538 2,440 2.639 2.000 5,978 2.153 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Sales Growth 8,393 0.128 0.081 -0.090 0.385 0.264 2,435 0.080 0.065 5,958 0.147 0.092 0.000 0.000 
Average Monthly Stock Turnover 8,390 1.699 1.180 0.509 3.568 1.535 2,436 1.523 1.119 5,954 1.771 1.217 0.000 0.000 
Inside Director Ratio 8,342 0.190 0.167 0.083 0.333 0.110 2,436 0.155 0.125 5,906 0.205 0.167 0.000 0.000 
CEO Tenure 8,418 7.368 5.000 2.000 16.000 6.400 2,440 6.418 5.000 5,978 7.755 6.000 0.000 0.000 
CEO Ownership 8,418 0.021 0.008 0.002 0.048 0.039 2,440 0.013 0.006 5,978 0.025 0.010 0.000 0.000 
Retire Age (0/1) (%) 8,418 7.603     2,440 5.082  5,978 8.632  0.000  
New CEO (0/1) (%) 8,418 20.373     2,440 20.697  5,978 20.241  0.638  
Board Size 8,342 10.524 10.000 7.000 14.000 2.810 2,436 11.259 11.000 5,906 10.222 10.000 0.000 0.000 
Fiscal Year Stock Return 8,387 0.144 0.099 -0.363 0.650 0.470 2,435 0.089 0.082 5,952 0.166 0.108 0.000 0.000 
ROA 8,244 0.136 0.132 0.031 0.244 0.084 2,392 0.131 0.129 5,852 0.139 0.133 0.000 0.000 
R&D/Total Assets 8,418 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.089 0.044 2,440 0.017 0.000 5,978 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.376 
Adv./Total Assets 8,418 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.026 2,440 0.013 0.000 5,978 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CapEx/Total Assets 8,418 0.050 0.039 0.001 0.106 0.045 2,440 0.044 0.037 5,978 0.052 0.040 0.000 0.000 
Institutional Holdings 8,418 0.665 0.689 0.419 0.885 0.193 2,440 0.687 0.701 5,978 0.657 0.683 0.000 0.000 
Market Cap ($ billions) 8,418 15.283 6.138 1.275 34.202 27.555 2,440 18.128 7.794 5,978 14.121 5.630 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Table 3.  The Likelihood of Granting MAP Incentives 
This table presents regression results for the likelihood of granting a MAP plan. In models (1) to (3), the dependent 
variable is the MAP grant dummy that equals one if firm grants a new MAP plan in year t and zero otherwise.  All 
independent firm variables and CEO ownership are measured in the year prior to the respective MAP grant. Other 
CEO variables are measured in the year of the grants. In model (2), we exclude all firms with one-time grants; in 
model (3), we exclude all firm-year observations from 2006 onward. Except for the Tobit regression, the table 
reports the marginal effects estimated at the mean for continuous variables and for a change in an indicator variable 
from zero to one for indicator variables. Model (4) is a Tobit regression and the dependent variable is the ratio of 
MAP target payout to total compensation. All regressions include year and industry dummies based on the Fama-
French 48 industries. See Appendix B for other variable details.  We report in parentheses p-values based on robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 Base No One-Time Grants Pre-2006 Tobit Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stock Vol./Accounting Vol. 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
# Business Segments 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.025*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Sales Growth -0.113*** -0.109*** -0.113*** -0.141*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Average Monthly Stock Turnover 
in Top Quartile 
-0.065*** -0.073*** -0.068*** -0.081*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Average Monthly Stock Turnover 
in Bottom Quartile 
0.015 0.013 0.012 0.013 
(0.47) (0.55) (0.56) (0.59) 
Inside Director Ratio -0.395*** -0.423*** -0.304*** -0.474*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln(CEO Tenure) -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.015 
 (0.77) (0.70) (0.65) (0.37) 
CEO Ownership -0.814** -0.891** -0.613* -1.102** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) 
Retire Age (0/1) -0.064** -0.069** -0.049* -0.086** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.04) 
New CEO (0/1) -0.031* -0.035* -0.023 -0.062** 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.24) (0.01) 
Board Size 0.009** 0.008** 0.007* 0.014*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.00) 
Fiscal Year Annual Stock Return 0.015 0.012 0.007 0.001 
 (0.20) (0.34) (0.52) (0.93) 
ROA 0.223 0.285* 0.258* 0.197 
 (0.12) (0.07) (0.06) (0.30) 
R&D/Total Assets -0.373 -0.314 -0.100 -0.685 
 (0.26) (0.37) (0.76) (0.12) 
Adv./Total Assets 0.988** 0.995** 0.883** 0.774 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.14) 
CapEx./Total Assets -0.155 -0.202 -0.253 -0.247 
 (0.56) (0.49) (0.30) (0.47) 
Institutional Holding 0.032 0.056 0.057 0.036 
 (0.61) (0.41) (0.36) (0.65) 
Ln(Market Cap) 0.007 0.009 0.003 0.006 
 (0.50) (0.42) (0.72) (0.65) 
Constant    -0.226 
    (0.13) 
Yr. & Ind. Dummies Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 7,827 7,303 6,118 7,773 
Pseudo R2 0.145 0.153 0.137 0.181 
 
 
Table 4. Determinants of MAP Plan Designs 
This table presents regression results for the determinants of MAP plan designs. In Panel A, we summarize the 
empirical predictions of the hypotheses we discussed in Section 5. In Panel B, the dependent variable is a binary 
variable that equals one if the MAP plan uses the performance measure specified in the column head and zero 
otherwise. In Panel C, the dependent variable equals one if the MAP plan use relative performance evaluation (RPE) 
and zero otherwise.  In Panel D, the dependent variable is the length of the performance period of a MAP plan for 
the tobit model estimation, and a binary variable equals one if the expected payout of a MAP plan is expressed in 
equities in the probit model estimation. We report the marginal effects estimated at the mean for continuous 
variables and for a change in an indicator variable from zero to one for indicator variables.  All regressions include 
year and industry dummies based on the Fama-French 48 industries. See Appendix B for variable details.  We report 
in parentheses p-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A. Hypotheses Summary for the Design of MAP Plans 
 
Choice of Performance Criteria 
Relative vs. 
Absolute 
Performance 
Length of 
Evaluation 
Period  
Stock (vs. 
Cash) 
Award 
 Earnings Sales Cash Flow EVA    
Hypotheses based on the predictions of efficient contracting theories:    
Measures related to signal quality:        
                  Performance Volatility - - - -  +  
Correlation (ROA, Industry ROA)    + 
 
 
Measures related to strategic imperatives:   
(SG&A + Advertising)/ Assets +      
                  O-score  +     
PPENT/Assets   +    
                  CEO Ownership - 
Financially Unconstrained (0/1)  - 
Target MAP Payout/Total Assets    
 
 + 
                HHI (Fama-French 48)    -/+   
Measures related to investment horizon:       
Avg. Monthly Stock Turnover     -  
R&D/Total Assets     +  
CapEx./Total Assets     +  
Hypotheses based on the CEO power view:    
Inside Director Ratio    -   
Ln(CEO Tenure)    -   
                   CEO Power Factor    -   
 
Panel B. Determinants of Performance Measures 
 Probit Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Earnings Based Sales Based 
Cash Flow 
Based EVA Based 
Signal quality:     
Performance Volatility      -0.071***      -0.314**       -0.010**     -0.002** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) 
Strategic imperatives: 
(SG&A+Adv.)/Total Assets         0.243**   
  (0.01)   
O-score          0.011**  
   (0.01)  
    (continued.)
 
 
Table 4 continued.    
PPENT/Total Assets  in Bottom Quartile      -0.040*    (0.05) 
PPENT/Total Assets in Top Quartile 
   0.002 
   (0.95) 
Performance Rank 
-0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 
(0.20) (0.36) (0.12) (0.69) 
Performance Rank×CEO Power Factor 
-0.002 0.003 0.000 -0.002 
(0.16) (0.28) (0.91) (0.27) 
Control variables:     
#Business Segments    -0.017** -0.004 0.006       0.014*** 
 (0.04) (0.67) (0.24) (0.00) 
Board Size 0.010 -0.002       -0.011** -0.000 
 (0.11) (0.75) (0.02) (0.92) 
CEO Power Factor 0.077 -0.256 -0.080       0.058*** 
 (0.33) (0.18) (0.22) (0.01) 
Retire Age (0/1) -0.005 0.093* -0.016 -0.026 
 (0.93) (0.08) (0.65) (0.17) 
New CEO (0/1)  -0.041* 0.016 0.006 -0.012 
 (0.08) (0.36) (0.68) (0.17) 
Institutional Holding  -0.188* 0.040 -0.000 -0.044 
 (0.06) (0.69) (1.00) (0.46) 
Ln(Market Cap) 0.011 0.013 0.007     -0.016** 
 (0.43) (0.47) (0.50) (0.03) 
Yr. & Ind. Dummies Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,857 1,896 1,521 1,882 
Pseudo R2 0.103 0.202 0.212 0.244 
Panel C.  Determinants of the Use of RPE 
 Probit Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Signal quality:     
Correlation (ROA, INDROA) Quartile 0.007** 0.007** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
     
HHI (Fama-French 48)   -1.127*** -1.193*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
CEO power:     
CEO Power Factor  -0.024*  -0.117* 
  (0.08)  (0.06) 
Inside Director Ratio -0.041  -0.186  
 (0.31)  (0.32)  
Ln(CEO Tenure) 0.007  0.026  
 (0.20)  (0.30)  
Control variables:    
#Business Segments 
 
-0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 
(0.48) (0.49) (0.86) (0.87) 
Board Size 
 
-0.001 -0.000 -0.004 -0.003 
(0.75) (0.85) (0.57) (0.69) 
CEO Ownership -0.620*  -2.996*  
 (0.07)  (0.06)  
Retire Age (0/1) 
 
-0.011 -0.009 -0.038 -0.027 
(0.34) (0.46) (0.41) (0.56) 
    (continued.)
    
 
 
Table 4 continued.    
New CEO (0/1) 0.011 -0.004 0.023 -0.028 
 (0.20) (0.40) (0.49) (0.14) 
Institutional Holding -0.014 -0.013 -0.046 -0.046 
 (0.60) (0.62) (0.70) (0.70) 
Ln(Market Cap) 0.009**   0.009*** 0.023 0.025* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.07) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes   
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,856 1,856 1,856 1,856 
Pseudo R2 0.214 0.210 0.071 0.067 
 
Panel D.  Determinants of Length of Evaluation Period and Award Type 
 (1)  (2) 
 
Length of Evaluation 
Period  
Stock-based MAP 
Awards 
 Tobit Regression  Probit Regression 
Signal quality:   
Earnings Volatility     0.096***  
 (0.00)  
Strategic imperatives:   
Average Monthly Stock Turnover in Top Quartile 
-0.062  
(0.31)  
Average Monthly Stock Turnover in Bottom Quartile 
     0.094***  
(0.00)  
R&D/Total Assets -0.285  
 (0.82)  
CapEx/Total Assets     1.512**  
 (0.01)   
CEO Ownership         -3.892*** 
   (0.00) 
Financially Unconstrained (0/1)       -0.091** 
   (0.03) 
Target Payout/Total Assets     171.620** 
   (0.02) 
Control variables:     
#Business Segments 0.020 0.016 
 (0.25) (0.32) 
Retire Age (0/1) -0.154 -0.036 
 (0.11) (0.27) 
New CEO (0/1) 
 
    -0.093*** -0.142 
(0.00) (0.13) 
Institutional Holding    -0.261** -0.074 
 (0.04) (0.67) 
Ln(Market Cap) -0.012 0.025 
 (0.69) (0.29) 
Constant      3.281***  
 (0.00)  
Year and Industry Dummies Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,855  1,807 
Pseudo R2 0.042  0.094 
 
   
 
 
Table 5. The Likelihood of Granting MAP Incentives before and after 2002  
The table presents regression results for the likelihood of granting MAP plans.  In Panel A, regression results are 
based on probit estimations and the dependent variable is a binary variable that equals one if firm grants a new MAP 
plan in that year and zero otherwise. We report the marginal effects estimated at the mean for continuous variables 
and for a change in an indicator variable from zero to one for indicator variables.  In Panel B, regression results are 
based on tobit estimations and the dependent variable is the ratio of MAP target payout to total compensation. All 
regressions include the same set of control variables as in Table 3, as well as year and industry dummies based on 
the Fama-French 48 industries. Coefficients for control variables are not reported to preserve space.  See Appendix 
B for variable details.  We report in parentheses p-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A. Probit Regressions for the Grant Decision 
 All  Cash-based MAP  Stock-based MAP  
    < 2002   ≥2002 
Diff 
(p-value)   < 2002   ≥2002 
Diff 
(p-value)   < 2002   ≥2002 
Diff 
(p-value) 
Stock Vol./Accounting Vol. 0.004*** 0.003* 0.08 0.002*** 0.001 0.09 0.002*** 0.002* 0.32 
 (0.00) (0.08)  (0.00) (0.47)  (0.01) (0.07)  
Sales Growth -0.118*** -0.098** 0.27 -0.041** -0.055** 0.92 -0.053*** -0.059* 0.32 
 (0.00) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.00) (0.08)  
# Business Segments 0.009 0.030*** 0.11 0.008* 0.007 0.48 0.001 0.022*** 0.04 
 (0.22) (0.00)  (0.06) (0.30)  (0.78) (0.00)  
Avg. Monthly Stock 
Turnover in Top Quartile 
-0.059** -0.077*** 0.87 -0.013 -0.045*** 0.20 -0.034** -0.045** 0.40 
(0.01) (0.01)  (0.31) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.04)  
Avg. Monthly Stock 
Turnover in Bottom Quartile 
0.004 0.026 0.57 0.018 0.016 0.68 -0.011 -0.001 0.46 
(0.86) (0.36)  (0.19) (0.43)  (0.36) (0.95)  
Inside Director Ratio -0.151* -0.702*** 0.00 -0.010 -0.260*** 0.01 -0.084* -0.494*** 0.01 
 (0.08) (0.00)  (0.86) (0.00)  (0.09) (0.00)  
Ln(CEO Tenure) -0.001 -0.003 0.96 -0.018*** -0.000 0.07 0.018** 0.007 0.11 
 (0.94) (0.88)  (0.01) (0.98)  (0.01) (0.61)  
CEO Ownership -0.608* -1.020*** 0.65 0.125 0.084 0.62 -1.746*** -1.951*** 0.14 
 (0.07) (0.01)  (0.41) (0.65)  (0.00) (0.00)  
Observations 3,705 4,122  3,350 3,383  3,393 3,629  
Pseudo R2 0.128 0.170  0.189 0.191  0.161 0.190   
Panel B. Tobit Regressions for the Grant Magnitude (Target Payout/Total Compensation) 
 All  Cash-based MAP  Stock-based MAP  
    < 2002   ≥2002 
Diff 
(p-value)   < 2002   ≥2002 
Diff 
(p-value)   < 2002   ≥2002 
Diff 
(p-value) 
Stock Vol./Accounting Vol. 0.006*** 0.004** 0.22 0.005*** 0.002 0.29 0.008*** 0.005** 0.34 
 (0.00) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.33)  (0.00) (0.03)  
Sales Growth -0.158*** -0.121** 0.58 -0.133** -0.134** 0.99 -0.181*** -0.121* 0.54 
 (0.00) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.09)  
# Business Segments 0.013 0.033*** 0.10 0.023* 0.011 0.47 0.004 0.044*** 0.02 
 (0.23) (0.00)  (0.09) (0.44)  (0.81) (0.00)  
Avg. Monthly Stock 
Turnover in Top Quartile 
-0.093** -0.077** 0.72 -0.017 -0.116*** 0.06 -0.167*** -0.088* 0.28 
(0.01) (0.02)  (0.68) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.06)  
Avg. Monthly Stock 
Turnover in Bottom Quartile 
0.002 0.019 0.66 0.048 0.034 0.75 -0.041 -0.017 0.68 
(0.94) (0.53)  (0.17) (0.42)  (0.39) (0.68)  
Inside Director Ratio -0.185 -0.751*** 0.00 -0.097 -0.604*** 0.02 -0.213 -0.944*** 0.00 
 (0.15) (0.00)  (0.52) (0.00)  (0.28) (0.00)  
Ln(CEO Tenure) -0.015 -0.014 0.97 -0.052** -0.027 0.49 0.039 0.016 0.60 
 (0.51) (0.55)  (0.04) (0.33)  (0.24) (0.60)  
CEO Ownership -0.849* -1.359*** 0.27 0.469 0.145 0.40 -7.351*** -4.519*** 0.23 
 (0.09) (0.01)  (0.26) (0.75)  (0.00) (0.00)  
Observations 3,673 4,100  3,328 3,371  3,383 3,619  
Pseudo R2 0.167 0.193  0.280 0.226  0.188 0.211  
 
 
Table 6.  The Spread of MAP Incentives after 2002 
This table presents multi-period logit regression results for the likelihood of initiating a MAP plan in the post-2002 
period. The dependent variable is equal to 1 in the year that a firm starts granting MAP incentives for the first time. 
After a firm initiated a MAP plan, it is dropped from the sample in subsequent years.  The dependent variable is equal to 
zero for all firm-year observations prior to the year the firm initiates a MAP plan and for all firm-year observations of 
firms that never adopted MAP incentives during our sample period. Bubble significance for a firm is measured as the 
average market to book equity ratio of the firm during the bubble period, 1997-1999, divided by the average market to 
book equity ratio of the firm during the pre-bubble period, 1994-1996. Large option expensing effect equals one if the 
firm’s average net profit margin during 2000 to 2002 is between -0.03 to 0.03, and zero otherwise. High Glass-Lewis 
industry dummy equals one if the industry has more than five firms identified in the Glass Lewis report. Model (4) only 
includes observations from 2006 onward. All independent firm variables are measured in the year prior to the respective 
MAP grant. CEO variables are measured in the year of the grants except for CEO ownership. All regressions include 
year and industry dummies based on the Fama-French 48 industries. See Appendix B for other variable details.  We 
report in parentheses p-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Bubble 
Effect 
Option 
Expensing 
Rule Change 
Option  
Backdating Scandals  All Together 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bubble Significance 0.005**    0.005** 0.006***
 (0.05)    (0.03) (0.00) 
Large Option Expensing Effect (0/1)  0.043***   0.028*** 0.011 
  (0.00)   (0.00) (0.13) 
Option Backdater (0/1)   0.007  0.010  
   (0.29)  (0.12)  
High Glass-Lewis Industry (0/1) 0.509*** 0.602***
(0.00) (0.00) 
Controls 
Stock Vol./Accounting Vol. 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.79) (0.82) (0.69) (0.65) (0.71) (0.25) 
# Business Segments 0.005** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.001 0.005** 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.21) (0.02) (0.32) 
Sales Growth -0.019 -0.026 -0.021* -0.001 -0.016 -0.002 
 (0.18) (0.14) (0.10) (0.90) (0.22) (0.82) 
Average Monthly Stock Turnover in 
Top Quartile 
-0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.005 -0.000 
(0.50) (0.85) (0.72) (0.95) (0.50) (0.93) 
Average Monthly Stock Turnover in 
Bottom Quartile 
-0.009 -0.012 -0.010 -0.009** -0.006 -0.009* 
(0.23) (0.22) (0.13) (0.01) (0.37) (0.06) 
Inside Director Ratio -0.131*** -0.157*** -0.120*** -0.028* -0.118*** -0.026 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.16) 
Ln(CEO Tenure) -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 0.001 -0.007 0.001 
 (0.15) (0.29) (0.22) (0.83) (0.15) (0.82) 
CEO Ownership -0.076 -0.068 -0.076 -0.053 -0.062 -0.154 
 (0.49) (0.66) (0.50) (0.53) (0.54) (0.10) 
Retire Age (0/1) -0.021** -0.025* -0.017* -0.003 -0.020** -0.004 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.63) (0.03) (0.61) 
New CEO (0/1) -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 0.004 -0.007 0.004 
 (0.48) (0.54) (0.46) (0.59) (0.47) (0.56) 
Board Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.75) (0.91) (0.75) (0.36) (0.87) (0.35) 
      (continued.) 
 
 
Table 6 continued.       
Fiscal Year Stock Return 0.005 0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.003 -0.002 
 (0.53) (0.89) (0.65) (0.46) (0.72) (0.73) 
ROA 0.014 -0.009 -0.020 -0.004 0.026 -0.005 
 (0.80) (0.88) (0.66) (0.88) (0.60) (0.87) 
R&D/Total Assets -0.333*** -0.456*** -0.324*** -0.187*** -0.310*** -0.199***
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Adv./Total Assets 0.237** 0.262 0.245** 0.200** 0.203* 0.161 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.15) 
CapEx./Total Assets 0.017 0.054 0.032 -0.039 0.026 -0.030 
 (0.86) (0.65) (0.72) (0.53) (0.77) (0.64) 
Institutional Holding -0.012 -0.035 -0.022 -0.010 -0.017 -0.011 
 (0.55) (0.17) (0.23) (0.41) (0.36) (0.36) 
Ln(Market Cap) -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.36) (0.52) (0.52) (0.93) (0.38) (0.33) 
Yr. & Ind. Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,194 2,491 2,491 858 2,194 711 
Pseudo R2 0.134 0.131 0.137 0.194 0.144 0.218 
   
 
 
Table 7. MAP Plans and Option Grants 
Panel A presents OLS regression results of stock options on MAP grants. The dependent variable is the value of annual 
option grants scaled by CEO total pay. The MAP grant dummy equals one if a firm grants a new MAP plan to CEO in 
that year and zero otherwise. MAP cover dummy equals one if there is an outstanding grant in the firm-year and zero 
otherwise. Cash-based (Stock-based) MAP grant dummy equals one if the granted MAP contract specifies cash (stocks) 
as the future payout and zero otherwise. Panel B presents within-firm post-MAP grant changes in option grants as a 
percentage of CEO total pay. Year 0 is the year of the MAP grant. Panel C presents the differences of changes in the 
percentage of option after granting MAP plans between plan-granting firms and matching firms. For each MAP grant, 
we identify a control observation in the same year using propensity score matching method. The propensity scores are 
estimated based on the firm and CEO characteristics in Table 3.  See Appendix B for variable details. The superscripts 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A.  Option Grants and MAP Incentives 
     Pre-2002 2002 Onward 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MAP Grant (0/1) -0.054***      
 (0.00)      
MAP Cover (0/1)  -0.062***     
  (0.00)     
MAP Target Payout/Total Comp.   -0.196***    
  (0.00)    
Cash-based MAP (0/1)    -0.035** -0.046** -0.028* 
    (0.01) (0.02) (0.08) 
Stock-based MAP (0/1)    -0.063*** -0.038** -0.074*** 
    (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Ln(CEO Tenure) -0.014** -0.014*** -0.013** -0.013** -0.023*** -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.44) 
CEO Ownership -0.338* -0.343* -0.335* -0.348* -0.255 -0.476** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.23) (0.03) 
Inside Director Ratio -0.097** -0.104** -0.101** -0.096** -0.078 -0.122** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.20) (0.04) 
Board Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.89) (1.00) (0.78) (0.87) (0.59) (0.42) 
Fiscal Year Stock Return -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 0.010 -0.041*** 
 (0.29) (0.25) (0.38) (0.29) (0.34) (0.00) 
Fiscal Year Stock Return (Lag) 0.014* 0.013 0.013* 0.014* 0.022** -0.000 
(0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.98) 
ROA 
 
-0.287*** -0.295*** -0.298*** -0.288*** -0.351*** -0.151 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.22) 
ROA (Lag) 0.304*** 0.307*** 0.310*** 0.302*** 0.391*** 0.167 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) 
Institutional Holding 0.176*** 0.177*** 0.173*** 0.175*** 0.228*** 0.118*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln(Market Cap) 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Daily Return Volatility 0.227*** 0.226*** 0.223*** 0.227*** 0.332*** 0.161*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -0.101 -0.096 -0.171*** -0.105 -0.291*** -0.362*** 
 (0.21) (0.23) (0.00) (0.24) (0.00) (0.00) 
Yr. & Ind. Dummies Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 7,987 7,987 7,933 7,987 3,822 4,165 
Adjusted R2 0.212 0.215 0.217 0.212 0.202 0.211 
 
 
Table 7 Continued. 
Panel B.  Changes in the Percentage of Option Grants  
 All MAP Grants  
 Obs. Mean t-stat Obs. Mean t-stat 
All Grants        
t=-1 to t=0 1,686 -0.014 -2.682***  
t=-1 to t=1 1,466 -0.025 -3.915***  
t=-1 to t=2 1,216 -0.037 -5.149***  
Before 2002 Cash Grants  Stock Grants  
t=-1 to t=0 283 0.028 1.794* 312 0.046 3.393*** 
t=-1 to t=1 240 0.062 3.241*** 266 0.059 4.045*** 
t=-1 to t=2 195 0.045 2.196** 216 0.071 3.836*** 
2002 Onward Cash Grants  Stock Grants  
t=-1 to t=0 407 -0.031 -3.277*** 630 -0.051 -6.664*** 
t=-1 to t=1 362 -0.058 -5.151*** 548 -0.078 -8.700*** 
t=-1 to t=2 307 -0.078 -6.153*** 457 -0.091 -8.729*** 
 Initial MAP Grants  
All Grants       
t=-1 to t=0 314 -0.023 -1.637    
t=-1 to t=1 275 -0.027 -1.516    
t=-1 to t=2 224 -0.022 -1.176    
Before 2002 Cash Grants  Stock Grants  
t=-1 to t=0 33 0.067 1.667 45 0.095 2.614** 
t=-1 to t=1 29 0.048 0.956 40 0.090 2.123** 
t=-1 to t=2 22 0.021 0.327 37 0.117 2.865*** 
2002 Onward Cash Grants  Stock Grants  
t=-1 to t=0 34 -0.019 -0.554 91 -0.137 -4.743*** 
t=-1 to t=1 29 -0.107 -2.093** 81 -0.161 -5.516*** 
t=-1 to t=2 27 -0.129 -2.618** 64 -0.169 -5.162*** 
 
Panel C.  Differences of the Changes in the Percentage of Option Grants  
 Diff-in-Diff = ChangesMAP-granting Firm – ChangesControl Firm  
 Obs. Mean t-stat Obs. Mean t-stat  
All Grants       
t=-1 to t=0 1,597 0.005 0.592     
t=-1 to t=1 1,391 0.003 0.322     
t=-1 to t=2 1,155 0.004 0.353     
Before 2002 Cash Grants  Stock Grants 
t=-1 to t=0 250 0.032 1.493 294 0.030 1.594  
t=-1 to t=1 207 0.014 0.547 251 0.019 0.942  
t=-1 to t=2 168 0.013 0.451 207 0.019 0.759  
2002 Onward Cash Grants  Stock Grants 
t=-1 to t=0 379 0.006 0.353 612 -0.036 -2.746*** 
t=-1 to t=1 335 0.003 0.215 535 -0.033 -2.003** 
t=-1 to t=2 282 0.012 0.610 448 -0.004 -0.184   
 
 
Table 8. CEO Total Compensation and MAP plans 
Panel A presents OLS regression results of CEO total compensation (in $MM) on MAP plan granting decisions. 
Regressions include year and firm fixed effects. Panel B presents the differences of post-grant changes in total 
compensation between MAP plan-adopting firms and matching firms. The matching firms are identified using the 
propensity score matching method. Year 0 is the year of the MAP grant. See Appendix B for variable definitions. 
We report in parentheses p-values based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A.  CEO Total Compensation and MAP Incentives   
 All <2002 ≥2002 All <2002 ≥2002 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MAP Grant (0/1) 0.012 -1.167* 0.106    (0.97) (0.09) (0.75)    
Cash-based MAP (0/1) 
   0.063 -1.308 -0.381 
   (0.89) (0.18) (0.45) 
Stock-based MAP (0/1) 
   -0.051 -1.334 0.286 
   (0.89) (0.12) (0.47) 
Ln(CEO Tenure) 0.073 -0.407 0.271 0.072 -0.405 0.275 
 (0.68) (0.14) (0.30) (0.68) (0.14) (0.29) 
CEO Ownership 2.201 15.201 -13.371 2.201 15.199 -13.459 
 (0.79) (0.30) (0.18) (0.79) (0.30) (0.17) 
Inside Director Ratio 
1.328 -0.902 2.650 1.325 -0.914 2.665 
(0.43) (0.76) (0.27) (0.43) (0.75) (0.27) 
Board Size 0.107 0.255* 0.121 0.107 0.255* 0.120 
 (0.21) (0.06) (0.42) (0.21) (0.06) (0.42) 
Fiscal Year Return 
1.557*** 1.122** 1.141** 1.558*** 1.121** 1.136** 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
Fiscal Year Return (Lag) 2.234*** 1.826*** 1.516*** 2.235*** 1.825*** 1.520*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ROA 2.621 0.645 6.873* 2.618 0.684 6.963* 
(0.38) (0.90) (0.08) (0.39) (0.90) (0.08) 
ROA (Lag) 10.714*** 10.637** -1.848 10.711*** 10.627** -1.837 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.69) (0.00) (0.03) (0.69) 
Institutional Holding 
-0.514 0.761 -1.749 -0.509 0.745 -1.794 
(0.64) (0.73) (0.34) (0.65) (0.73) (0.33) 
Daily Return Volatility 
1.297 1.736 -0.509 1.295 1.734 -0.514 
(0.23) (0.46) (0.67) (0.23) (0.46) (0.66) 
Constant 12.950*** 7.661* 14.069*** 12.894*** 36.197*** 12.654*** 
 (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Size Deciles Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,987 3,822 4,165 7,987 3,822 4,165 
Adjusted R2 0.469 0.523 0.517 0.469 0.523 0.517 
 
Panel B. Difference of the Changes in CEO Total Compensation after Granting MAP Plans 
 Obs. Mean Diff-in-Diff t-stat Obs. Mean Diff-in-Diff t-stat  
All Grants       
t=-1 to t=0 1,597 -0.116 -0.270     
t=-1 to t=1 1,391 0.002 0.003     
t=-1 to t=2 1,155 -0.071 -0.138     
Cash Grants Before 2002     Stock Grants Before 2002 
t=-1 to t=0 250 0.123 0.112 294 -0.717 -0.709  
t=-1 to t=1 207 1.779 0.906 251 1.614 1.381  
t=-1 to t=2 168 1.637 0.775 207 0.900 0.768  
Cash Grants 2002 Onward     Stock Grants 2002 Onward 
t=-1 to t=0 379 0.642 0.921 612 0.019 0.041 
t=-1 to t=1 335 0.036 0.043 535 0.311 0.578 
t=-1 to t=2 282 1.195 1.216 448 0.516 0.736   
 
